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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this report is to address the current inertia 
that exists over the Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. The 
report explains how Bills of Rights have been used across 
the world to entrench human rights and build rights-based 
societies. It also dispels the misunderstandings over the 
purpose of, and extent of protection afforded by, a Bill 
of Rights. The report traces the calls for a Bill of Rights 
back to the 1960s in Northern Ireland and analyses the 
political parties and UK governments’ support since that 
time. Alongside this, the report examines the various 
political negotiations, agreements and declarations that 
have set out the specific provisions and obligations on 
the UK government in relation to a Bill of Rights. The 
report concludes with the views of the various political 
parties, based on interviews conducted in the past year, 
and recommends ways in which the British and Irish 
governments could meaningfully re-engage the parties 
on this issue. 
The research for the report was undertaken for the 
Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. The study draws 
upon a range of literature which includes material from 
media reports; party manifestos and policy papers; past 
and current parliamentary and committee debates; on-
going political statements; publications from human 
rights organisations and academic literature on Bills 
of Rights. It also includes Interviews with the leaders 
and representatives of the political parties alongside 
the views of civil society organisations. The British 
and Irish governments, the Joint Committee on the 
Implementation of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 
in Dáil Eireann and representatives of the Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission and individuals with 
specialist expertise in human rights also participated in 
the study.
Chapter One sets the context by explaining how a 
Bill of Rights is used in different contexts in different 
countries throughout the world. It contradicts some of 
the existing myths about a Bill of Rights, for example that 
it substitutes judicial policy-making for governmental 
policy-making. The misunderstandings about a Bill of 
Rights is a theme which runs throughout this report, and 
the historical background to the introduction of the ECHR 
should remind us that governments are often wary about 
introducing legislation which holds it to account. The 
introductory chapter sets out how a Bill of Rights does 
exactly that - particularly in countries such as Northern 
Ireland. It explains how a Bill of Rights could provide 
a legal framework in relation to the contentious rights 
issues that are the cause of so much conflict and political 
antagonism. As the chapter notes, technical solutions 
will not be sufficient to address the challenges which 
countries coming out of conflict face. As has been the 
case elsewhere, Northern Ireland needs a foundational 
document setting out the principles and standards that 
will command the allegiance of the people. 
Chapter 2 highlights how discussions on the future 
constitutional framework for Northern Ireland that 
included proposals on human rights preceded the peace 
agreement in 1998. It traces the demands for a Charter/
Bill of Rights as far back as the mid 1960’s with political 
parties later lamenting the missed opportunities of not 
introducing such legislation at an earlier stage. 
The following chapter shows how the various political 
agreements as well as a range of government 
declarations attempted to take forward the framework 
for human rights. These chapters show that support for 
such a framework came from all parties. As the public 
statements from the DUP and UUP in the 1996-1998 
Forum for Political Dialogue illustrate, the demands from 
the main Unionist parties were strongest in the period 
leading up to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. 
However, as time progressed a shared framework did 
not expand to the Unionist parties agreeing on which 
rights should be protected. Support over recent years 
has varied amongst the Unionist parties, whilst the, 
smaller Unionist/Loyalist, PUP party continues to call 
for a strong Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. The 
chapter also shows how the Nationalist parties and the 
Alliance Party were consistent in their demands over the 
past forty years for a Bill of Right for Northern Ireland 
as part of the constitutional settlement. The interviews, 
alongside the findings from the various Commissions 
and fora established to deal with this issue, reflect the 
chasm that has developed over the content of such a 
bill, alongside extent of its protection and the jurisdiction 
to which it should apply. 
Chapter 3 shows that the Joint Declaration in 2003 
reiterated the UK government’s commitment to 
bring forward legislation at Westminster Despite this 
commitment, and despite being in receipt of the NIHRC’s 
advice since 2008, the current UK government has taken 
a different approach to the implementation of the 1998 
Agreements proposal on a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland. The report shows that despite the proposal for a 
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland being viewed initially by 
both governments as an integral part of the constitutional 
settlement, there is now a divergence of position. This 
also raises questions in relation to the UK government’s 
commitment to fulfil its obligations, as specified in the 
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Vienna Convention in relation to international treaties. 
The report, in Chapter 3, shows how the current 
UK government adopted a different approach to the 
Agreement’s proposal by establishing a Commission 
to examine the possibility of the UK having its own 
Bill of Rights and incorporating Northern Ireland into 
this process. The Commission, which did not reach an 
agreement on a UK Bill, concluded that the Northern 
Ireland process was a separate one and it should not 
interfere or delay its progress. Despite there being no 
formal response to the UK Commission’s conclusion 
from the British government, the Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland then proposed that the issue of a Bill 
of Rights should be devolved to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. However, none of the parties responded to 
the NIO correspondence on this issue. The research 
shows the reactions of the Northern Ireland parties to this 
proposal. It notes their concern that parties consistently 
exercise a veto in the Northern Ireland Assembly on 
issues perceived by either side to be contentious and 
reveals the reality that such a proposal would continue 
to block progress on taking forward the discussions.  
The report also highlights the diversity of views that now 
exist between the main Unionist and Nationalist parties 
on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. On analysing 
the language used by the two main unionist parties 
in the interviews, their position appears to be that it is 
the responsibility of others to convince them that a Bill 
of Rights is needed for Northern Ireland. They argue 
that they are open to persuasion but that is where the 
obligation ends.  As the research shows, the other main 
parties, in favour of a Bill of Rights, note that they are the 
ones being left to take forward the British government’s 
responsibility to implement the proposals from the 
Belfast/Good Friday and St Andrews Agreements. 
The interviews show the concerns of the Nationalist or 
Alliance parties that they should not have to persuade 
the main Unionist parties of the need for a Bill of Rights 
for Northern Ireland since that responsibility lies with the 
sovereign government.
The final chapter shows that the Northern Ireland parties 
have also failed to reach agreement on other important 
issues and recognising the difficulty in resolving these 
matters internally, the First and deputy First Minister 
established an all-party group to take these forward. This 
was independently facilitated by US diplomat Richard 
Haass and Megan O’Sullivan with stakeholders from 
civil society also being invited to put forward their views. 
The Bill of Rights was not in the terms of reference for 
the Haass-O’Sullivan talks however they were asked to 
consider related matters which opened the space for 
other issues to be discussed. 
Although the Haass-O’Sullivan talks concluded without 
agreement in December 2013, the final report made 
a number of recommendations, one of which was 
that a Commission on Identity and Culture be set up 
to consider amongst other issues a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland. As the final chapter shows there are 
mixed views amongst the political parties on whether or 
not this is the best way to take forward the discussions 
on a Bill of Rights, with some holding the view that it 
should not preclude other routes to progress. Parties 
that pledged support for a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights 
reiterated the importance of keeping the issue on the 
political agenda and that an alternative approach to the 
current stalemate was much needed. 
This report shows that while the British and Irish 
governments have been engaged for many years 
on various initiatives in relation to a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland, their efforts have been inconsistent 
in scope and application, lacking a policy framework to 
guide their interventions. We conclude with a number of 
options on how this political vacuum can be addressed. 
We highlight the need for a policy framework to create 
greater coherence in the British and Irish governments’ 
approach to a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. We 
recommend that the framework starts a process by 
which an assessment can be made of the extent to which 
the parties agree and/or disagree with the proposals 
forwarded by the NIHRC, the Bill of Rights Forum and any 
other bodies. Within such a process, parties should also 
be encouraged to agree a set of principles from which 
the rights appropriate to the particular circumstances of 
Northern Ireland can be developed. 
Throughout the report, the diversity of knowledge 
amongst the parties on the applicability, and/or 
justiciability of various human rights standards is 
apparent. We recommend that if such a process were 
to be established on a future Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland, then guidance involving specific human rights 
expertise be provided to assist the parties in their 
deliberations. Some consideration should be given to 
not just identifying the assistance needed by the political 
parties but also to other factors conducive to building 
political consensus. A policy framework should also 
identify the input of civil society in Northern Ireland and 
ensure its support for any future Bill of Rights. 
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1 S.C Nolutshungu, ‘The constitutional question in South Africa’ in I. Shivji (ed), State and Constitutionalism: An African debate on democracy (Sapes Trust    
(Southern Africa Political and Economic Series) 1991) cited in A. Smith and E. McLaughlin, ‘Delivering equality: equality mainstreaming and constitutionalism of   
socio-economic rights’ (2010) 61(2) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 94.
2 Bill of Rights Forum, Final Report: Recommendations to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (31 March 2008).   
For further information on this report see Chapter 3.
3 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Advice to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (10 December 2008). For   
further information on this advice see Chapter 3.
4 Northern Ireland Office, Consultation Paper, A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Next Steps (November 2009). For further information on this paper see Chapter 3.
5 For further information both on the NIHRC’s recommendations and the NIO’s response see Chapter 3 of this report. The potential of a UK Bill of Rights    
was investigated by a UK Bill of Rights Commission created by the British government in March 2011. The Commission’s report was published in December   
2012; Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us Volume 1 (December 2012). For further detail on this Commission    
and the report see Chapter 3.
1CHAPTER 1
WHAT ARE BILLS OF RIGHTS?
Introduction
The aim of this research is to assess the current position 
of the Northern Ireland political parties, and the position 
of the British and Irish governments, on a Bill of Rights 
for Northern Ireland. Given the political vacuum that 
exists on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, the project 
also aims to explore ways forward. In enabling us to 
undertake this project, we would like to acknowledge the 
support of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust which 
has a long history of involvement in human rights issues 
in Northern Ireland. We would also like to acknowledge 
the co-operation of the interviewees who agreed to 
take part in the research, providing information and 
documentation as well as making time for interviews. 
Given the diversity of opinion amongst the political parties 
in Northern Ireland, it is not surprising that a discussion 
of rights elicits the expression of strong viewpoints. In 
making an assessment of the various positions on a 
Bill of Rights, we have striven to provide an accurate 
account of these viewpoints alongside an independent 
and impartial analysis. 
A current assessment is needed since the discussion 
on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland has gone on 
for decades. The debate can be traced back to the 
1970s when political parties and the UK government 
advocated, albeit with different reasons, for a Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland. Since then, at various 
‘constitutional moments’,1 the debate has continued with 
party positions changing over time. What follows here 
is an outline of the proposals, stemming from the 1998 
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, and the ways in which 
these proposals have been taken forward in recent 
years. Later chapters will outline both the historical and 
constitutional background to the debate.
Under the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 
and the Northern Ireland Act, s.69 (7) 1998 
(NIA), the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission (NIHRC) was tasked with 
consulting and advising the British government 
on what rights should be included in a proposed Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland. Further provisions in the 
2003 Joint Declaration at Hillsborough reiterated the 
British government’s commitment to bringing forward 
legislation on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland at 
Westminster. The St Andrews Agreement agreed to 
establish a Bill of Rights Forum in 2006 and two years 
later, the Forum presented its report to the NIHRC.2 
Later that same year (10 December 2008) the NIHRC 
submitted its advice on a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland to the British government.3 The following year, 
in 2009, the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) responded 
to this advice by publishing its consultation document.4 
The NIO selected only certain sections of the NIHRC’s 
advice for consultation and forwarded the view that 
further discussion on the NIHRC’s advice could take 
place through a newly established United Kingdom (UK) 
Commission on a potential Bill of Rights for the whole 
of the UK.5 Since 2009, there has been little further 
discussion on a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights between 
the parties and the government. The absence of political 
debate between the parties and the governments has 
created a vacuum in Northern Ireland and the proposal 
for a Bill of Rights remains an outstanding issue from 
both the Belfast and St. Andrews Agreements.
The remainder of this chapter sets out the context for a 
Bill of Rights and its importance to the Northern Ireland 
peace process. The conceptual discussion focuses on 
the parameters for a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland 
in an attempt to clarify some of the misunderstandings 
associated with it. 
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6 R. McQuigg, Bills of Rights: A Comparative Perspective (Intersentia 2014) 3. McQuigg notes that Australia is the only democratic nation in the world which does   
not have a Bill of Rights of some description.
7 R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard University Press 2004) 220. Hirschl has described this   
phenomenon as a ‘booming industry’.
When Bills of Rights are described as being entrenched, this means they cannot be easily repealed by a simple majority of Parliament. Examples where  countries  
have adopted constitutionally entrenched Bills of Rights are South Africa, Kenya, Canada (the Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms) and the United 
States. Examples of non-entrenched, statutory Bills of Rights are New Zealand’s Bill of Rights Act 2000 and the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998.
8 C.O.H. Parkinson, Bills of Rights and Decolonization: The Emergence of Human Rights Instruments in Britain’s Overseas Territories (Oxford University Press 2007) 3.
9 P. Alston, ‘A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights’ in P. Alston (ed), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights Comparative Perspectives 
(Oxford University Press 1999) 10.
10 A. Eide and A. Rosas, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge’ in A. Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
A Textbook (2nd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 2001) 6.
11 P. O’Connell, Vindicating Socio-Economic Rights International Standards and Comparative Experiences (Routledge Press 2012) 6.
12 Ibid.
13 D. Erdos, Delegating Rights Protection (Oxford University Press 2010) 3.
14 B. Dickson, ‘The Protection of human rights-lessons from Northern Ireland’ (2000) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 213, 214. Dickson draws upon Northern 
Ireland’s experience of majoritarianism from 1921-1972. Dickson argues that ‘it is the failure properly to protect human rights in Northern Ireland that made the troubles 
of the past 30 years worse or so worse than they might have been’. See also A. Kavanagh, ‘The Role of a Bill of Rights in Reconstructing Northern Ireland’ (2004) 26 
Human Rights Quarterly 956, 964-967. See further Mageean and O’Brien’s article where they quote from O’Brien’s unpublished LLM thesis which highlights that in an 
analysis of speeches of the Irish government to the General Assembly of the UN reveals that in every speech from 1969 until 1977, and from 1987 until 1991, the denial 
of rights was mentioned as a contributing factor to the conflict. P. Mageean and M. O’Brien, ‘From the Margins to the Mainstream: Human Rights and the Good Friday 
Agreement’ (1999) 22 Fordham International Law Journal 1499, 1504. 
15 M. McWilliams, ‘Human Rights underpins devolution’, in Common Sense: Reflections on the Human Rights Act, Liberty, June 2010, 44. 
16 M. Hunt, ‘Reshaping Constitutionalism’ in J. Morison, K. McEvoy and G. Anthony (eds), Judges, Transition and Human Rights Cultures (Oxford University Press 2007) 
468.
17 Jeremy Waldron’s writings include: ‘A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights’ (1993) 13 (1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18; ‘The Core of the Case Against 
Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346; Law and Disagreement (Clarendon Press 1999); ‘Taking Group Rights Carefully’ in G. Huscroft and P. Rishworth 
(eds), Litigating Rights (Hart Publishing 2002).
18 R. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (Yale University Press 1989).
Defining Bills of Rights 
According to McQuigg, there has been an ‘upsurge in 
rights protection around the globe’ so that ‘remaining 
without a Bill of Rights is becoming a less than viable 
option’.6 The proliferation of Bills of Rights worldwide 
takes place in different formats and can range from those 
that are constitutionally entrenched to non-entrenched 
through to statutory bills.7 This illustrates that there is 
no ‘one size fits all’ model and correspondingly there 
is no fixed definition of the term. Despite the view that, 
‘the phrase Bill of Rights has been used at various times 
in different contexts by different people’8 it is possible 
to identify certain characteristics underpinning Bills of 
Rights. The common features are the formal binding 
commitments upon government to protect and uphold 
certain fundamental rights and values; the entrenchment 
process making it difficult to set aside the rights 
enshrined in the bill and the provision for addressing 
violations.9 Bills of Rights are therefore important as they 
aim to provide legal protection for fundamental rights as 
a practical matter and place them beyond the reach of 
any government. This helps to ensure that the protection 
of fundamental rights is ‘not at the mercy of changing 
governmental policies and programmes’.10 These rights 
are enjoyed by all as they are viewed as fundamental 
rights as opposed to the rights that follow from ordinary 
legislation secured and retained at the discretion of the 
legislature and subject to repeal. Fundamental rights 
impose a ‘substantive, binding obligation’.11 This is in 
contrast with ‘mere legislative entitlements’12 which 
impose a moral obligation upon states. Politically, 
Bills of Rights ‘demarcate the power and discretion of 
the State’.13 Placing fundamental values and rights 
beyond government is particularly important for post-
conflict societies where parliamentary politics has failed 
or where discriminatory practices existed. In divided 
societies like Northern Ireland, where the governance of 
institutions created ‘divisions and provoked resentment 
and alienation’,14 a Bill of Rights is viewed as central to 
institutional reform.15
Placing fundamental rights beyond government and 
limiting the power of majorities whose role is checked 
and balanced by the judiciary has been, and continues 
to be, one of the most controversial aspects of Bills of 
Rights. For example, ‘democratic positivists’16 such 
as Waldron17 and Dahl18 argue that shifting the onus 
of interpretation and elaboration of rights away from 
elected officials into the hands of non-elected and 
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19 J. Waldron, ‘A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights’ (1993) 13(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18, 28.
20 S. Gardbaum, ‘The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’ (2001) 49 American Journal of Comparative International Law 707, 740.
21 This phrase was coined by Professor Bickel and has set out the contours of the debate in A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of 
American Politics (2nd edn, Yale University Press 1986); See B. Friedman, ‘The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy’ 
(1998) 73 New York University Law Review 333.
22 Allan also supports this view by stating that it is not obvious why any supporter of democracy would wish to take power out of the hands of the elected representatives 
of ordinary citizens and give it to unelected judges to exercise in highly contentious matters where no side can be characterized as wicked or unjust’. See J. Allan, ‘The 
Effect of a Statutory Bill of Rights where Parliament is Sovereign: The Lesson from New Zealand’ in T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing and A.Tomkins (eds), Sceptical Essays on 
Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2001) 390.
23 R. McQuigg, Bills of Rights: A Comparative Perspective (Intersentia 2014) 3.
24 C. Turner, ‘Political representations of law in Northern Ireland’ (2010) Public Law 451. Turner explains that Unionists’ idea of what a Bill of Rights would, and should, 
encompass greatly diverges from the expectations to that of the Nationalists, primarily due to the diverging perceptions of the legitimacy of the state and its institutions.
25 B. Neuborne, ‘Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States’ (1982) 57 New York University Law Review 363, 370-371.
26 It has been reported that during the period 1922-1972, the Catholic minority suffered discrimination and inequality on grounds of religion and political belief at the 
hands of the majority in areas of public and private employment, housing, education and welfare, policing and emergency law, see: Government of Northern Ireland, 
Disturbances in Northern Ireland: Report of the [Cameron] Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland (Cmd 532, September 1969); D. J. Smith and G. 
Chambers, Inequality in Northern Ireland (Clarendon Press 1991); J. Whyte ‘How much discrimination was there under the Unionist regime, 1921-68?’ in T. Gallagher 
and J. O’Connell (eds), Contemporary Irish Studies (Manchester University Press 1983). Furthermore, a number of civil and political rights were specifically denied to the 
minority by the Special Powers Act 1922. For example; freedom of speech and press, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom from warrantless search 
and seizure, freedom from warrantless arrest, trial by jury, presumption of innocence when charged and freedom from self-incrimination and the right to privacy. This 
wide range of permanent emergency powers were introduced by the Unionist government to curtail the political violent campaign by the Irish Republican Army (IRA).
27 C. Bell, Bills of Rights Considered April 2012, unpublished (on file with the authors). This report was published by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, 
Is that right? Fact and Fiction on a Bill of Rights (2012). However, the draft report differs slightly with the final publication. This quote is found in the draft, not in the final 
report.
28 R. Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Harvard University Press 1996).
29 This phrase is borrowed from M. Hunt, ‘Reshaping Constitutionalism’ in J. Morison, K. McEvoy and G. Anthony (eds), Judges, Transition and Human Rights Cultures 
(Oxford University Press 2007) 468.
non-accountable judges could lead to the ‘disabling of 
representative institutions’.19 It is argued that this could 
lead to the displacement of popular self-government20 
in favour of government ‘by judiciary’. Rather than 
facilitating governance by the people for the people, 
embellishing judicial authority to this degree is seen as 
‘counter-majoritarian’,21 displacing democratic politics in 
favour of judicial power.22 In short, democratic positivists 
are therefore concerned about the legitimacy of courts 
usurping parliament’s role. Such concerns are, as 
McQuigg notes, ‘particularly relevant in jurisdictions in 
which the concept of parliamentary sovereignty forms a 
foundational part of their constitutional structure, such 
as the United Kingdom’.23 This anxiety is rooted in a 
traditional understanding of the doctrine of separation of 
powers through which the legislature makes the law, the 
executive implements the law, and the judiciary applies 
and enforces the law. 24
Arguably, this is an overly simplistic conventional 
understanding and represents a misunderstanding 
of democracy in practice. Realpolitik demands 
countenancing and facilitating the operation of a 
‘pragmatic mixture of functions’.25 A Bill of Rights is about 
providing an adjudicative forum/space for individuals or 
groups to hold government and others to account for 
actions that affect their lives; decisions which would 
be ignored if a Bill of Rights was not in existence. For 
transitional societies, where previous governments 
passed discriminatory legislation and perpetuated 
human rights violations,26 having another institution, the 
judiciary, acting as an effective check and balance on 
the government, is essential. The role of judges is not 
to take over government and dictate policy but rather to 
ensure that when governments are passing legislation 
and policies, they must adhere to a set of minimum 
standards and fundamental values and rights. Bills of 
Rights mean that members of legislative bodies are 
also required to take account of and implement a set 
of core common values and rights. In so doing, Bills of 
Rights ensure that ‘everyone is treated humanely, and 
has the possibility of participating in the democratic life 
of the country. [Bills of] Rights therefore limit politicians’ 
power in the name of improving democracy rather than 
undermining it’.27 Bills of Rights are put in place to create 
accountability and establish good governance as well as 
to assure people that whoever is the Minister, irrespective 
of their particular personal views, everyone’s rights will 
be protected.
In this context, Dworkin,28 a ‘liberal constitutionalist’,29 
argues that courts are the ideal institutions to act as a 
12
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30 Sir J. Laws, ‘Wednesbury’ in C. Forsyth and I. Hare (eds), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord: Essays on Public Law in Honour of Sir William Wade (Oxford 
University Press 1998) 201.
31 B. Porter, ‘Economic and Social Rights in the Bill of Rights: Protecting the Integrity of Human Rights in Northern Ireland’ in Committee on the Administration of Justice 
(CAJ), Just News (May 2008) 3.
32 The first Chief Justice of Northern Ireland was a Catholic but after his death in 1925 it was not until 1949 that a Catholic was appointed to the Supreme Court. Only 
6 out of 68 judicial senior appointments were Catholic. See J. Whyte, ‘How much discrimination was there under the Unionist regime, 1921-68?’ in T. Gallagher and J. 
O’Connell (eds.), Contemporary Irish Studies (Manchester University Press 1983) 28. See also C. Palley, Constitutional Law and Minorities, (Minority Rights Group 1978) 
398: ‘The great majority of holders of judicial office in Northern Ireland have been Protestants...Assertions that the judiciary is biased have been made particularly in 
respect of the magistracy and county court Judges’.
33 B. O’Leary and J. McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism, Understanding Northern Ireland (The Athlone Press London and Atlantic Highlands 1996) 117.
34 A. G. Donaldson, ‘Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of Northern Ireland’ (1959) 37 Canadian Bar Review 189, 199. Donaldson argued that the few decisions 
taken by the courts under the Act did not touch upon what he called the ‘fundamentals of parliamentary government’. Rather they were concerned with the distribution of 
legislative power between London and Belfast.
35 Londonderry County Council v McGlade [1925] NI 47. For a commentary on this and other cases during the Stormont era see H. Calvert, ‘Constitutional law in 
Northern Ireland: A study in Regional government’ (1968) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly. See also B. Hadfield, Northern Ireland: Politics and the Constitution (Open 
University Press 1982). 
36 S. Choudhry, ‘After the Rights Revolution: Bills of Rights in the Post-Conflict State’ (2010) 6 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 301, 312.
37 Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC); 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) Justice Sachs of the South African Constitutional Court, 100 (now former 
Justice).
38 Ibid.
39 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) para. 48.
fetter on majoritarian government as they have a different 
role from politicians since they ‘have no programme, 
no mandate, no popular vote’.30 It is also understood, 
however, that when it comes to agreeing the appropriate 
remedies in response to a judicial case, this decision will 
remain with the legislature. As Porter states:
There need be no compromise of the expertise and role of 
the legislative branch to design and implement [appropriate 
programmes] necessary to the implementation of rights. 
But there must be a place - a court or tribunal - to go for a 
hearing and a decision if rights have been violated.31
However, this raises two interrelated issues. Firstly, 
judges are expected to be independent and impartial and 
it is this expectation that poses particular problems for 
transitional societies where courts have formerly served 
as instruments of government repression. In the context 
of Northern Ireland, where independence and impartiality 
were key problems for the judiciary in the past,32 O’Leary 
comments ‘the minority’s natural perception was that 
their complaints could not even be formally judicially 
investigated, let alone redressed’.33 Consequently, 
the courts showed remarkable pusillanimity in hearing 
the few cases taken against the Northern Ireland 
Parliament and seemed loathe to find an adverse finding 
against the Northern Ireland Parliament.34 Only on one 
occasion did the court uphold an allegation of religious 
discrimination.35 
For transitional societies needing to leave its past behind 
and for judges to be trusted as guardians and protectors 
of Bills of Rights dispensing justice, impartiality must 
not be underestimated. As Choudhry states the issue 
‘is whether they [judges] can be trusted to adjudicate 
impartially under a new constitutional scheme that 
includes a bill of rights which renders unconstitutional 
precisely that conduct which was previously legal’.36 
This leads to the second point, in carrying out their 
adjudicative role, judges have a ‘particularly heavy 
responsibility ... to [be] sensitive to considerations of 
institutional competence and the separation of powers’.37 
As one former judge of the South African Constitutional 
Court warned ‘undue judicial adventurism can be as 
damaging as excessive judicial timidity’.38 Achieving a 
balance between these two polar positions is essential 
albeit complex. A moderate degree of deference is 
needed when reviewing decisions where the authorities/
decision makers are better qualified than the judiciary. 
Where a person or institution has a specific expertise in 
a particular area, the courts must show respect. 
This does not mean that courts abdicate their 
responsibility and ‘rubber-stamp an unreasonable 
decision simply because of the complexity of the 
decision or the identity of the decision-maker’.39 In 
Bills of Rights, courts have a role to determine whether 
fundamental rights have been violated which in turn 
requires the court to determine what obligations, if any, 
a person or institution must take to ensure compliance 
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with Bills of Rights. These obligations are both negative 
and positive. The negative refers to the obligation 
not to interfere with people’s rights. The positive 
obligation requires programmes, policies and legislation 
that may require time and resources to ensure the 
implementation of rights. Modern Bills of Rights should 
include both positive and negative obligations. If they do 
not, according to Porter this ‘will create discriminatory 
consequences for those who happen to rely on positive 
measures from governments because of their unique 
circumstances of need’.40 A Bill of Rights that requires 
government to protect as well as to actively implement 
rights41 is an important mechanism to ensure effective 
governance especially in divided societies.
On the other hand, a Bill of Rights should not be seen 
as a panacea to cure all ills or result in the government 
providing everyone with a job or a house. A Bill of 
Rights is not about substituting judicial policy-making 
for governmental policy-making. Rather judges are 
applying and interpreting the law to ensure the policies 
and laws are compliant with fundamental rights and 
values, a role that the court is best qualified to carry out. 
As Porter and Nolan note, ‘in some instances, courts are 
better equipped than the legislature to assess complex 
evidence, particularly in relation to the effects of policies 
on disadvantaged groups who may have been ignored 
by legislators’.42 Elected politicians are not above the 
law, they too are bound by the rule of law and when 
it comes to making decisions relating to fundamental 
rights, they need to take decisions in an equitable and 
fair manner. If they fail to do so, a Bill of Rights can help 
the most vulnerable to hold government to account.43
In ‘affording protections and safeguarding against 
abuses’,44 a Bill of Rights acts as a bridge in helping 
countries transition from conflict - to move forward from 
‘a contentious past as well as being a point of reference 
for future generations’.45 In countries such as Northern 
Ireland advocating for a Bill of Rights does not imply 
that anti-discrimination legislation or European Union 
legislation that mainstreams equality are of less value or 
need to be replaced. Indeed Bills of Rights constitute only 
one piece of the equality and human rights jigsaw and 
should be supplemented and complemented by equality 
and human rights legislation at the national, European 
and international levels.46 Moreover, as Livingstone has 
argued, securing equality requires a level of detail which 
is inappropriate for a Bill of Rights.47 What a Bill of Rights 
can do is to provide a constitutional point of reference 
that becomes a legal framework through which the 
politicians act within. This was envisaged in the Belfast/
Good Friday Agreement, wherein it accorded that the:
…power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction 
there [Northern Ireland] exercises rigorous impartiality on 
behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities 
and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full 
respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural 
rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and 
parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the 
identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities………48
A Bill of Rights could achieve this by providing a legal 
framework that is underpinned by these values and 
through which contentious issues could be dealt with 
rather than negotiated between political parties. 
The following section sets out the methodology showing 
how the material was gathered.
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49 Towards the completion of this project, a proposal arose from the Haass talks that the Bill of Rights (alongside a range of other issues) should be dealt with by a 
Commission on Identity, Culture and Tradition. 
Methodology 
The study draws upon a range of literature including 
but not limited to: political parties’ submissions to the 
NIHRC’s 2008 advice, the Bill of Rights Forum’s 2008 
report, the NIO’s consultation paper and the final report 
of the UK Bill of Rights Commission 2012. Material has 
also been drawn from media reports; party manifestos 
and policy papers; past and current parliamentary and 
committee debates; on-going political statements; 
publications from human rights organisations and 
academic literature on Bills of Rights. 
Seven political parties in Northern Ireland were invited 
to be interviewed with only one party, the Traditional 
Unionist Voice (TUV), making no response to the 
invitation. The invitations were through formal letter 
and follow up correspondence. Twelve interviews were 
held with the leaders or human rights spokespersons 
for the political parties. In addition seven interviews 
with civil society organisations were held together 
with interviews with the NIHRC and individuals with 
specialist expertise or practice in the field of human 
rights. Invitations were also sent to the British and Irish 
governments. The NIO declined the invitation to meet 
and instead offered the views of the Secretary of State 
through correspondence. Interviews were held with 
representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
(DFA), the Irish representative of the British-Irish 
Secretariat and members of the Joint Committee on the 
Implementation of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 
in Dáil Éireann. 
The interviews followed a structured format with 
interviewees being asked their opinions on a Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland; on why they felt the process 
on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland had stalled; on 
the prospects of moving the process forward and on 
identifying ways for doing so. Some political interviewees 
were asked specific questions on the changing positions 
of their party over the years. A number of parties were 
asked about the basis of their objection to the Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights. Many political interviewees in 
favour of a Bill of Rights aired their opinion on why they 
believed other parties were opposed to it. Interviews with 
civil society groups and other stakeholders focused on 
their work to date around a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights 
and their views on how to move the process forward. 
Request for permission to record the interviews was 
made and in the majority of cases, this was permitted 
with interviews being transcribed in full following each 
interview. All interviewees were told that before any 
quotes would be used, their permission would be sought. 
Where an interviewee did not wish to be attributed, the 
date of the interview is referred to instead. 
In making an assessment of the position of each of 
the Northern Ireland political parties, and the two 
governments, the report is divided as follows. Chapter 
2 traces the history of the concept of a Bill of Rights 
in Northern Ireland and sets out the political parties’ 
and governments’ proposals prior to the Belfast/Good 
Friday Agreement. Chapter 3 examines the specific 
provisions relating to a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland; 
the obligations of the British and Irish governments in 
negotiated agreements and the advice submitted to 
the UK government in response to statutory mandates 
and the political parties’ response to these reports/
advice. The final chapter focuses on the current political 
thinking on a Bill of Rights and sets out a number of 
recommendations taking into account the proposals 
from the 2013 Haass Talks.49
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54 Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972, ch.22, s.1(1).
55 Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985, Article 2, available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/aia/aiadoc.htm#b 
56 Signed by the British and Irish Governments, and all the Northern Irish political parties with the exception of the DUP and UKUP. 
57 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 1998, ‘Strand One: Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland’. This proposal is repeated four times in Strand One. 
CHAPTER 2 
POLITICAL PARTIES’ POSITION ON 
A BILL OF RIGHTS BEFORE THE 
BELFAST/GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT
Introduction
This chapter traces the origins of the proposals for 
a Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland and sets out the 
political parties’ position prior to the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement. The chapter begins with providing the context 
and background to the debate highlighting previous 
constitutional interventions and attempts by politicians 
to set the seeds for a Bill of Rights. The chapter then 
provides a chronology of the concept of a Bill of Rights 
for Northern Ireland by sketching the political parties’ 
position on the need for a Bill of Rights up until 1998 
when the debate on a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights 
moved from an abstract to a very concrete phase with 
the advent of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement.
The Context and Origins of Bills of Rights
In the mid-1960s Sheelagh Murnaghan, an elected 
member of the newly formed Ulster Liberal Party, 
attempted on four separate occasions to initiate legislation 
on a Bill of Rights in the Northern Ireland Parliament. 
On each occasion she failed to garner sufficient support 
amongst the Unionist parties dominant in the Stormont 
Parliament at that time.50 When serious civil unrest 
broke out in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s, some 
held the view that if Murnaghan’s earlier proposals on 
a Bill of Rights had been passed by Northern Ireland’s 
Parliament, much of the later conflict could have been 
avoided.51
The momentum around a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland took place a number of years 
later, arising consistently at key constitutional 
moments over the following decades. In the 
period from 1972–1998, there have been a 
number of constitutional moments in which proposals for 
a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland have been routinely 
discussed. In 1972 the Northern Ireland Parliament52 
was dissolved after 50 years53 and replaced by direct 
rule from Westminster.54 The UK Government embarked 
on a series of consultations with the political parties 
in Northern Ireland to find a system of government 
acceptable to the majority of people of Northern Ireland. 
Each consultation proposed various systems of self-rule 
alongside a Bill of Rights that could contribute to a stable 
system of government for Northern Ireland. 
This constitutional debate continued into the mid-1980s 
with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement which 
provided the Irish government with a consultative role 
in the administration of Northern Ireland for the first 
time.55 The two main Unionist parties opposed the inter-
governmental agreement and they subsequently refused 
to engage in government consultations. 
From the early 1990s consultations again took place on 
the devolution of power to Northern Ireland and, following 
the ceasefires in the mid-1990s, multi-party peace talks 
commenced involving the British and Irish governments 
and the Northern Ireland political parties. This culminated 
in the signing56 of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement in 
April 1998 which agreed power-sharing arrangements 
for a new Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly. This 
Assembly would act, along with the other institutions 
in Northern Ireland, in accordance with the ‘European 
Convention on Human Rights and any Bill of Rights’.57
2
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written constitutional provisions, it is practicable to legislate for the protection of human rights in a way which cannot readily be done elsewhere in the UK’. (Linenhall 
Library Belfast). 
A Chronology of the Concept of a Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland 
1970s
On 28 March 1972 the Northern Ireland (Stormont) 
Parliament was dissolved and Direct Rule came into 
effect. Direct Rule was introduced as a temporary 
measure and a series of discussions and conferences 
was convened in an attempt to restore self-rule to 
Northern Ireland. It was within this context that calls for 
a bill of rights arose. The first roundtable talks between 
parties and the UK government on the constitutional 
issue: ‘to find a system of government which will enjoy the 
support and the respect of the overwhelming majority’58 
took place in Darlington, between 22-25 September 
1972, with, among others, the Ulster Unionist Party and 
the Alliance Party.59 The SDLP boycotted the conference 
due to the continuing practice of internment. The DUP 
were also absent.60 The DUP, unlike the other parties, 
did not make any proposals on the future governance of 
Northern Ireland at this time.61 Prior to the conference a 
number of the parties, including the SDLP made public 
their proposals on how they wished to see Northern 
Ireland governed. The SDLP policy document stated the 
following: ‘the ECHR shall become part of the internal 
law of Northern Ireland’. Although it did not call for a Bill 
of Rights for Northern Ireland62 it referenced a Bill of 
Rights being applicable to a Northern Ireland Assembly, 
which would legislate on certain matters.63
In their policy document, the UUP advocated for a 
justiciable Bill of Rights, under the heading ‘Safeguards 
and Protection for Minorities’ they stated that its 
enforcement ‘would be by the normal judicial remedies 
of injunction, mandamus and declaratory judgment 
[…] relying on the existing Supreme Court of Northern 
Ireland’.64 The party proposed ‘the introduction of a 
precise and comprehensive Bill of Rights’ and argued 
that although ‘they considerably restrict the powers of 
Government, the restriction of over-wide legislative 
and executive action in these matters is an important 
safeguard’.65
The Alliance Party also advocated that a Bill of Rights be 
introduced as part of any new structure:
Alliance considers that in any legislation passed at 
Westminster to set up a new structure of government for 
the province there should be incorporated a Bill of Rights, 
guaranteeing to all citizens their fundamental Human 
Rights based on the UDHR66 
In making reference to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Alliance Party was aware that 
economic and social rights were encompassed as well 
as civil and political rights.
The UK Government’s Proposals
Based on the September 1972 Darlington talks, the 
UK government produced a Constitutional White Paper 
proposing a Northern Ireland Assembly, with a power-
sharing Executive, and a ‘Charter for Human Rights for 
Northern Ireland’.67 This Charter of Human Rights was 
to govern the proposed Northern Ireland Assembly and 
would not be applicable to the UK.68 It is worth noting 
that the proposals from the UK government, primarily 
Sir William Whitelaw, the then Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland had been a result of the Darlington 
Conference but had also been shaped by his Advisory 
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76 Belfast Telegraph, Thursday, 22 March 1973. (Linenhall Library Belfast).
77 UUP, ‘Peace, Order and Good Government’, Assembly Manifesto, 1973, 19, available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/uup/uup73.htm 
78 Northern Ireland Act 17 July 1974, s.1(1).
79 Northern Ireland Act 17 July 1974, s.2(1). 
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81 The Vanguard Unionist Party, which had been formed out of a split from the UUP in 1972. 
82 The U.U.U.C constituted 60.3% of the Convention’s membership, available at http://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/rcc1975.htm. The Unionist Party of 
Northern Ireland did not join the coalition and won 5 seats. 
83 Her Majesty’s Government, Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention Report, 8 November 1975, para. 130, available at http://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/convention/
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84 Under the Chairmanship of Sir Robert Lowery. 
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Commission of which Sheelagh Murnaghan was a 
member.69 Her Northern Ireland Bill of Rights had 
previously been rejected but once the idea received 
the UK Government’s backing the debate took form.70 
However the Commission paper noticeably ‘lacked 
proposals for due process rights and the repeal of 
emergency powers’.71 The proposed Charter focused 
instead on issues of equality and discrimination72 and 
would encompass, ‘the right to equality of benefit and 
opportunity’73 which would be justiciable. It also argued 
that:
any action of a discriminatory character by a Government 
Department, a local authority or public body could be made 
the subject of a court action, and the whole range of legal 
remedies is available to the litigant.74
The Government’s White Paper stated that ‘there has 
been general agreement that a new settlement should in 
some way or other make provision for the protection of 
fundamental human rights and freedoms’.75 The Alliance 
Party voted in favour of the White Paper, along with 
the UUP who further advocated in its 1973 Assembly 
Manifesto,76 its ‘support for a Charter of Human Rights’.77
The Constitutional Convention
The Assembly was short-lived78 and on its dissolution 
in 1974 the UK government called for a Constitutional 
Convention in recognition that a more considered 
approach was needed to decide ‘what provisions for the 
government of Northern Ireland is likely to command 
the most widespread acceptance throughout the 
community’.79 It was proposed that the Northern Ireland 
parties would participate in the Convention through 
elections. 
In its election manifesto, the Alliance Party pledged to 
advocate for a Bill of Rights and stated the following: 
The Alliance Party will be pressing for a Bill of Rights in the 
future Constitution of Northern Ireland. Such a Bill of Rights 
must guarantee equality of citizenship to every person in 
the Province and must be enforceable through the courts 
of law.80
Neither the SDLP’s nor the UUP’s manifestos made any 
reference to a bill of rights. In the run up to the Convention 
the three main Unionist parties at that time, the UUP, the 
VUP81 and the DUP and one independent, formed the 
United Ulster Unionist Council (U.U.U.C).82 The U.U.U.C 
made two recommendations; a Bill of Constitutional 
Rights to guarantee the stability and integrity of the 
Northern Ireland Constitution, and a general Bill of Rights 
and Duties to protect the rights of the individual citizen.83 
This Bill of Rights and Duties was proposed for the whole 
of the United Kingdom. The Chairman of the Convention 
published the Report of the Convention on 20 November 
197584 which stated that the U.U.U.C were concerned 
that a separate Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland had the 
potential to create ‘an unnecessary sense of grievance 
capable of being exploited by dissident minorities’ and 
that, if a Bill of Rights were not to be to be introduced for 
the whole of the UK, then ‘the U.U.U.C. considers that 
the new regional legislature must give priority to enacting 
provisions for fundamental rights covering those fields 
within its competence’.85
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The report from the Convention also noted that the 
Alliance Party advocated for ‘a Bill of Rights based on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights forming part of 
any new Northern Ireland Constitution and enforceable 
by the Courts’86 the report also shows that the SDLP 
had argued for ‘the European Convention on Human 
Rights [to] be made part of the domestic law of Northern 
Ireland’.87 The Convention also noted that there were:
two lengthy submissions from the Northern Ireland Civil 
Rights Association and the Ulster Citizens’ Civil Liberties 
Advice Centre advocated a Bill of Rights ... [but] .. the 
Business Committee did not consider it necessary to print 
and publish any of these papers.88
Although the Constitutional Convention ended in March 
197689 the debate around the Bill of Rights continued. 
The Ulster Citizens Civil Liberties Centre (UCCLC), a 
think-tank sponsored by the UDA loyalist paramilitary 
group90 also made a submission to the Constitutional 
Convention. The New Ulster Political Research Group 
(NUPRG), amended the UCCLC’s original submission 
and published this as ‘A Proposed Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland’. It stated that ‘the Alliance Party, 
the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland and the SDLP 
expressed [..] their conviction that a Bill of Rights was 
a necessary aspect to a constitutional settlement’.91 The 
NUPRG’s publication included economic and social 
rights as well as civil and political rights. It argued that 
health and well-being of the individual should be seen as 
essential to the enjoyment of life and security and that 
[…] medical care and other social services be included.92 
The Northern Ireland Constitution Act also established 
the Standing Advisory Committee on Human Rights.93 
In May 1975 the Standing Advisory Committee informed 
the Government that it would ‘undertake a study of a 
possible Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’ and held 
a public consultation following the publication of its 
discussion paper,94 which concluded that: 
in the event of the return of devolved legislative and 
executive functions to a new government in Northern 
Ireland (either before or after the incorporation of the 
European Convention into domestic law), it would be 
desirable for the enabling legislation to include a clear 
and enforceable charter of rights for Northern Ireland. 
The guarantees in this charter should be consonant with 
those which may accompany devolution in other parts of 
the United Kingdom. This charter of rights could be more 
comprehensive than the European Convention and should 
be framed in the light of whatever at the time seem to be 
the special needs of the people of Northern Ireland.95
In May 1977 the Chairperson of the SDLP96 wrote an open 
letter to the Irish News entitled the ‘SDLP commitment to 
the Human Rights Bill’. The letter stated that the Human 
Rights Bill would be based on the ECHR and enacted 
within the context of a constitutional settlement.97 The 
Alliance Party also placed on record their views on a 
Bill of Rights in a House of Lords debate in which Lord 
Dunleath stated: 
on the whole, we should prefer a Bill of Rights that covers 
the entire United Kingdom but […] it may be some time 
before legislation to that end can be prepared. We feel 
that it is more urgent that there should be a Bill of Rights 
for Northern Ireland. That is why, even though we should 
prefer an overall Bill, […] I should like a Bill of Rights to 
be quickly introduced for Northern Ireland, short circuiting 
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1980s
In 1980, the SDLP’s annual conference confirmed its 
position that:
whatever might be the constitutional arrangement for a 
New Ireland, SDLP believes that it will be necessary to 
bring forward a Bill of Rights as part of that constitution in 
order to indicate clearly the safeguards for basic human 
and civil rights which would be provided as part of any 
settlement.99
At the same time the Progressive Unionist Party 
(PUP) also considered a Bill of Rights as a necessary 
component to achieve peace in Northern Ireland stating: 
A Bill of Rights for all United Kingdom citizens should 
be drawn and ratified by the Westminster Parliament, 
guaranteed by the European Court of Human Rights and 
the United Nations Commission for Human Rights.100
In 1982 the UK Government proposed a system of 
‘rolling devolution’ under which a new Northern Ireland 
Assembly would be elected.101 From the outset the 
SDLP boycotted the Assembly as did the UUP for a 
period. Parties to the Assembly submitted proposals 
on how best to grant rights protection under a devolved 
government. The UUP submitted a discussion paper 
and under the heading, ‘A Bill of Rights’ stated that: 
although there is no significant pressure in the UK taken 
as whole [..] for a written constitution enshrining citizens’ 
rights […] this does not mean the case cannot be made 
out for some specific entrenchment of citizens’ rights (with 
adequate machinery to protect them) as a component of a 
package for devolved government in Northern Ireland.102
The UUP proposed that: 
the effects of such legislation would be to provide machinery 
whereby (a) any action on the part of the Northern Ireland 
devolved institution conflicting with any listed right would 
be declared void and (b) any act of the Northern Ireland 
administration conflicting with any such right would be 
declared unlawful. [...] It is an essential ingredient of an 
effective Bill of Rights that it be enforceable at the suit of 
the individual citizen as simply, cheaply and expeditiously 
as possible through the established courts of law.103
The UUP also asserted that: 
although the desirability of a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland as part of a scheme for devolved government has 
been discussed in terms of the advantages to the minority, 
the rights listed would, of course, be conferred on every 
citizen in the Province and it would be just as open to a 
member of the majority community to seek and obtain 
redress for infringement.104
The DUP supported the concept of a Bill of Rights. 
Although their preference was for a UK wide Bill of 
Rights, they stated that they ‘would be prepared to 
accept a proposal for a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights 
which would incorporate a range of statutory safeguards 
against abuse of power’.105
The Alliance Party proposed that: 
the European Convention on Human Rights should be 
incorporated into the law in Northern Ireland without waiting 
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for its incorporation into the law of the UK as a whole [and 
that] special attention should be given to see that adequate 
remedies are available to persons whose Rights under the 
Bill have been abused.106
Just over a year later, in November 1985 the Anglo-
Irish Agreement was signed between the UK and Irish 
governments. The 1985 Agreement gave the Irish 
government a consultative role on Northern Ireland, 
including security and legal affairs.107 The UUP and 
DUP rejected the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Sinn Féin also 
rejected the Agreement.108 In June 1986 the Secretary 
of State announced the UK government’s decision to 
dissolve the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Anglo-Irish 
Agreement significantly altered the UUP’s position on 
devolution including their support for a Northern Ireland 
Bill of Rights. In reassessing its position, it stated:
It is true that ‘the Way Forward’ suggested, as a possibility, 
a Bill of Rights as part of a component package for a 
devolved government in Northern Ireland. The Anglo-Irish 
Agreement has all but extinguished that possibility … with 
Westminster rule continuing for the foreseeable future, a 
Bill of Rights would have to apply to the whole of the UK.109
1990s
The new decade marked another round of internal 
debates within the parties on issues relating to a Bill 
of Rights for Northern Ireland within the context of 
devolution. 
Sinn Féin supported the concept of a Bill of Rights 
arguing that, ‘in a democratic state, a Bill or Charter of 
Rights is desirable. Sinn Féin supports the view that such 
legislation is essential to the defence of civil liberties’. It 
gave different options for its incorporation:
to ensure the widest possible support of such legislation, 
it would need to be conceived, initiated, enacted and 
legislated into existence by the combined will of the state. 
Alternatively, the Bill or Charter could be included in the 
constitution of the state.110
For Sinn Féin it was clear that as long as Northern 
Ireland was part of the UK ‘A Bill or Charter of Rights 
for the six counties would have to be implemented and 
passed at Westminster’.111
Within the SDLP, concerns were expressed that the Bill 
of Rights debate was becoming a political/legal debate 
rather than a societal one and believed that rights 
protection needed to be the emphasis. 
If, instead of discussing a Bill of Rights in the context of a 
‘constitutional settlement’, we would discuss it as a form 
of guaranteeing rights for everyone in the north, no matter 
what the current or future political arrangements, then the 
politics here might start to change.112
In 1991 the Brookes/Mayhew talks, involving four main 
Northern Ireland political parties, commenced. In a last 
bid to prevent the talks collapsing on 9 November 1992, 
the UUP presented a series of proposals which included 
a Bill of Rights.113 However, the Unionist parties withdrew 
from the talks the following day. 
In 1993 the DUP published its Constitutional Manifesto 
calling for full devolution to Northern Ireland arguing that 
‘we see any new arrangements for the administration 
of the Province being underpinned by a Bill of Rights 
safeguarding individual rights’.114 The DUP’s 1993 
annual conference passed a resolution calling for:
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the establishment of a working party to draft a ‘Statement 
of First Principles’ that will take effect in Ulster as a regional 
Bill of Rights [..] supporting a call that will guarantee the 
equality and liberty of the people.115
The party placed this proposal in the context of the 
‘increasing alienation of the people of Ulster, and the 
attempt by Government to ignore the rights and liberties 
of the majority community’.116
In the 1994 European Parliament election, the Alliance 
party was the only party to make reference to a Bill of 
Rights in the party manifestos. It reiterated its former 
position:
that there should be greater and more systematic protection 
of human rights in Northern Ireland. A Bill of Rights, based 
on the European Convention on Human Rights should 
be incorporated for Northern Ireland and should be 
enforceable directly by the citizens in Northern Ireland.117
The Alliance Party continued to advocate this view and 
in the May 1997 Westminster election stated: 
A Bill of Rights [should be enacted] to protect every 
individual citizen and prevent discrimination. Whilst every 
community needs a legal structure for the preservation of 
individual rights, it is particularly vital in a divided society like 
Northern Ireland, where there is a history of discrimination 
and disadvantage. Alliance will insist on the incorporation 
of a Bill of Rights and a series of other measures to give 
confidence to all citizens that their rights will be protected.118
The SDLP manifesto pledged to ‘continue to lobby for a 
Bill of Rights for the North’ and in keeping with its 1990 
policy paper. It added: 
it is our view that achieving the objectives […] requires a 
dynamic, inclusive approach based on promoting social 
integration, challenging negative stereotypes, working 
towards a change in the kind of mindset that tolerates the 
current widespread discrimination and ever-increasing 
wealth differentials.119
It proposed that ‘enforced by the support it would attract 
from all sections of the population north and south, the 
incorporation of a bill of rights must be a key aspect of 
that agreement’.120
In 1996 Westminster passed the Northern Ireland (Entry 
into Negotiations) Act which established the Northern 
Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue, for the purpose of 
‘discussion of issues relevant to promoting dialogue and 
understanding within Northern Ireland’, to run in parallel 
with the multi-party peace talks.121 Sinn Féin did not 
participate and the SDLP withdrew its members in July 
1996.122 In a Forum debate on the establishment of a bill 
of rights for Northern Ireland, there was general all-party 
support for a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights and most 
noticeably between the two main Unionist parties.
The DUP proposed the motion: 
This Forum calls for the establishment of a bill of rights 
for Northern Ireland. Given the general, all-party support 
for the principle of a bill of rights, the Forum urges the 
Government to proceed with this proposal.
The party’s position at that time is worth quoting 
extensively: 
As the motion indicates, there is general, all-party support 
for the principle of a bill of rights […]
a bill of rights is necessary, even if only to clarify and 
consolidate the law. More importantly it would plant the 
seed for the development of what has been called a rights 
culture. [..] 
equality and liberty would be seen as being not just for 
certain sections of the community [..] but for the great mass 
of people.
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There is no need to await the outcome of the political talks 
process before introducing a bill of rights. [..] 
A bill of rights should be designed to protect all people of 
Northern Ireland. [..]
If we had an entrenched bill of rights, we might have 
avoided the fuzzied and muddied confusion of the last few 
summers. Communities would have their right to parade in 
accordance with their traditions, enshrined in legislation, 
as would those wishing to organise peaceful pickets 
or peaceful protests. Such clarification would increase 
people’s confidence in the law and its application.123
The DUP’s Ian Paisley Jr. also accused the UK 
government of being the stumbling block:
In the Brookes/Mayhew talks it became very clear that 
there was cross-party support, that the stumbling block 
to introduce such a measure was a reluctant Government 
afraid of the implications for the rest of the United Kingdom. 
They argued then – that many fundamental rights are 
already enshrined in separate pieces of legislation, 
rendering a bill of rights unnecessary. I do not believe that 
anyone in this Chamber thinks fair-employment or equal-
opportunities legislation is any substitute and it is wrong for 
the government to hide behind that fig-leaf.124 
Though clearly supporting a Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights it is important to note this was a pragmatic rather 
than an ideological position: 
Ideally, there would be a bill of rights for all the citizens 
of the entire United Kingdom. […] failing that my party 
believes the Government should not stand in the way of a 
Northern Ireland bill of rights.125
The UUP also supported this motion and stated, ‘on 
behalf of the Ulster Unionists, I support the Democratic 
Unionist Party’s motion, which recognises the all-party 
support for a bill of rights’.126
Prior to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement this appears 
to be the last formal reference to cross party support for 
a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. 
Overview of Political Parties 
As can be seen from the above, a ‘Bill of Rights’ for 
Northern Ireland has received support from all the 
political parties in Northern Ireland since the early 
1970s. However, a shared framework on the provision 
of the protection of fundamental rights did not expand 
to agreement on which rights should be protected, the 
means and extent of this protection and, more recently, 
the jurisdiction to which they should apply. 
Loyalists and Unionists - The Protestant/Unionist/
Loyalist community’s attitudes towards a Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights have diverged. Loyalist-aligned 
parties have continually supported the concept of a 
Bill of Rights whilst mainstream unionism has at times 
advocated for a Bill of Rights and at other times rejected 
the idea. Further, within unionism the political parties 
have disagreed, some supporting a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland whilst others rejecting it. The Ulster 
Unionist Party, since the mid-2000s, supported the 
Conservative party’s proposals for a UK Bill of Rights 
which would apply to Northern Ireland. One commentator 
has noted that Unionists’ idea of what a Bill of Rights 
would, and should, encompass greatly diverges from the 
expectations to that of the Nationalists, primarily due to 
the diverging perceptions of the legitimacy of the state 
and its institutions.127
Nationalists and Republicans – Nationalist and 
Republican parties have continuously called for a Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland and supported an inclusive 
Bill of Rights, entailing economic and social rights as 
well as civil and political rights. 
Alliance Party – The Alliance Party has supported 
proposals for a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland since 
its inception in the 1970s. The party has been open to 
have a UK wide Bill of Rights apply to Northern Ireland 
as well as the possibility of a separate Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the issue of a Bill of Rights 
was on the political agenda from the 1960s onwards. 
However, despite the formal acceptance by the political 
parties and others of the need for a Bill of Rights, that 
was where the commitment ended. No steps were taken 
by the British government, responsible for legislating, 
to provide an actual framework to establish how a Bill 
of Rights for Northern Ireland could be introduced.128 
Thus at this abstract level, it is not surprising that there 
was agreement on the idea of a Bill of Rights amongst 
the political parties as a debate over the objectives and 
content of a Bill of Rights could be overlooked. Although 
human rights should have been worthy of greater 
protection in their own right, as Harvey and Livingstone 
note:
the political reality was, however, that despite formal 
acceptance by the political parties and others of the need 
for a Bill of Rights, agreement on a secure system of human 
rights protection for Northern Ireland became linked with 
the conclusion of a broader constitutional settlement.129
With the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, 
a broader constitutional agreement was reached which 
was an important milestone for the concept of a separate 
Bill of Rights as an integral part of peace building. 
The Agreement’s reference to a Bill of Rights and 
subsequent Agreements and Declarations is examined 
in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POLITICAL RESPONSE TO 
OBLIGATIONS SET OUT IN 
NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS AND 
DECLARATIONS
Introduction
As noted in the previous chapter, the proposal for a Bill 
of Rights for Northern Ireland predates the Belfast/Good 
Friday Agreement. Following the Agreement in April 
1998, the discussion on a Bill of Rights gained much 
greater momentum. This chapter examines the specific 
provisions as well as the obligations on the British and 
Irish governments in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 
relating to this proposal. Other negotiated agreements 
such as the Joint Declaration by the British and Irish 
governments, April 2003; the St Andrews Agreement, 
October 2006; and the Hillsborough Agreement, February 
2010, will also be discussed. This chapter also includes 
the political parties’ response to the following: the Bill of 
Rights Forum’s report, 2008; the Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission’s advice, 2008; the Northern Ireland 
Office’s consultation paper, 2009 and the UK Bill of Rights 
Commission’s report, 2012.
Negotiated Settlements
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement
The extent of references to human rights, and in 
particular to a Bill of Rights, in the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement130 led to the former UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, describing the 
Agreement as ‘conspicuous by the centrality it gives 
to equality and human rights concerns’.131 The main 
provision for a Bill of Rights is in the ‘Rights, safeguards 
and equality of opportunity’ section which states the 
following:
The new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 
will be invited to consult and to advise on the scope 
for defining, in Westminster legislation, rights 
supplementary to those in the European Convention 
on Human Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of 
Northern Ireland, drawing as appropriate on international 
instruments and experience. These additional rights to 
reflect the principles of mutual respect for the identity and 
ethos of both communities and parity of esteem, and—
taken together with the European Convention on Human 
Rights—to constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.
Among the issues for consideration by the Commission will 
be:
the formulation of a general obligation on government and 
public bodies fully to respect, on the basis of equality of 
treatment, the identity and ethos of both communities in 
Northern Ireland; and 
a clear formulation of the rights not to be discriminated 
against and to equality of opportunity in both the public and 
private sectors.132
Experience elsewhere shows that countries that have 
adopted a Bill of Rights, such as South Africa, Zimbabwe 
and Canada, have done so within a political process and 
are often drafted by politicians as part of the constitution-
making process. In Northern Ireland, the Agreement 
gave the task of advising on a Bill of Rights to the 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) 
and there was an assumption that political discussions 
would then take place, following the submission of the 
Commission’s advice. During the negotiations leading 
to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement the political 
parties agreed on a proposal for a Bill of Rights but 
did not spend time deliberating on the contents of the 
Bill.133 Rather the issues for both governments and the 
Northern Ireland political parties were the constitutional 
3
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relationships between Great Britain, Ireland and 
Northern Ireland alongside the arrangements for a new 
power sharing Executive and Legislative Assembly. The 
deliberations also focused on proposals for institutional 
change, such as policing and criminal justice, and the 
decommissioning of weapons. The discussions on 
human rights received less time during the negotiations 
and the sections on the Bill of Rights were drafted into 
the Agreement at the later stages in what has been 
described as ‘a somewhat haphazard way’.134 According 
to one civil servant, even the transferral of responsibility 
to the NIHRC was done in a ‘fairly cursory manner, it 
wasn’t that people spent hours on it’.135 This was also 
the case for a number of other key proposals, such as 
the clauses on victims that were also drafted during the 
final stages of the negotiations.
While it was vital to secure agreement on issues at the 
macro level between the various negotiating parties, it 
is also recognised that enhancing equality and greater 
protection of human rights is fundamental to the 
constitutional arrangements in post conflict societies. As 
noted in the previous chapter, derogations from human 
rights protection were identified as being amongst the 
key factors that sustained, and prolonged, the Northern 
Ireland conflict.136 It is also the case that the contested 
legacy over human rights in Northern Ireland meant 
that the proposal for a Bill of Rights was launched in a 
difficult political context. 
Given the contested legacy of human rights in Northern 
Ireland it was not left to the politicians in Northern 
Ireland to negotiate and develop a Bill of Rights. The 
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement established a new and 
independent human rights commission to advise the 
UK government on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, 
which would be passed as Westminster legislation. 
Many argue that a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland 
was removed from the political process here because 
it was recognised that it would not progress if left solely 
to the Northern Irish parties. To succeed it would need 
to be taken forward by the sovereign government and 
passed as UK legislation. Further the Agreement is an 
international treaty which is binding on its signatories, 
including the UK government. Despite this responsibility, 
language used by the current UK government indicates 
that they do not believe that it is incumbent on the UK 
government to pass the Bill of Rights as Westminster 
legislation: 
Looking ahead, if there were agreement on additional 
rights for Northern Ireland, the Government would examine 
how best to take things forward. We remain open to the 
suggestion that work on this, including legislation, could be 
taken forward by the Assembly.137
As signatories of an international treaty, both 
governments (British and Irish) hold responsibility for 
taking the Agreement forward but on this issue several 
politicians and stakeholders have commented on the 
key responsibility lying with the British government:
It is the duty of [the British] Government as a co-guarantor 
of the [A]greement and as a signatory to it to engage 
proactively with all stakeholders, including political parties, 
to seek consensus on this [Bill of Rights] and other 
outstanding issues. There is a particular responsibility 
around leadership on such issues when they are reserved 
matters.138
It was their [British government] job to implement the Bill 
of Rights.139
The responsibility sits with the UK government [..] what 
is crucially missing is an indication from the British 
government that their intention is to legislate for something 
worthy of the name of a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights.140
Of further concern was the Secretary of State’s 
statement, July 2013, in which she indicated the current 
government’s opinion that:  
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nor public bodies can infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission; (c) arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are proofed to ensure that they 
do not infringe the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’; Operation of the Assembly, 11.‘The Assembly may appoint a special Committee to examine and 
report on whether a measure or proposal for legislation is in conformity with equality requirements, including the ECHR/Bill of Rights’; Legislation, 26. ‘The Assembly will 
have authority to pass primary legislation for Northern Ireland in devolved areas, subject to: (a) the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it 
which, if the courts found to be breached, would render the relevant legislation null and void’.
142 Professor Michael O’Flaherty, Chief Commissioner of the NIHRC (September 2011 – November 2013). Interview with Professor Michael O’Flaherty and David 
Russell, NIHRC 11 September 2013. 
143 Interview with Brian Gormally, Committee on the Administration of Justice, 17 October 2013.
144 Interview with Alban Maginness, MLA, SDLP, 1 May 2013.
145 Kevin Hanratty. Interview with Kevin Hanratty and Helen Flynn, Human Rights Consortium, 31 October 2013.
146 Interview with Naomi Long, MP, Alliance Party, 2 October 2013.
147 Interview with Vincent Parker, Special Adviser to the deputy First Minister, Sinn Féin, 7 June 2013.
148 Interview with David Ford, MLA, Alliance Party, 25 November 2013.
149 Interview with Billy Hutchinson, PUP, 11 September 2013.
There is a degree of ambiguity in the way that section 
[‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity’] is 
written. Although the text does not go as far as stating that 
there would definitely be a Bill of Rights, the [A]greement 
certainly contemplated that a Bill of Rights was potentially 
an important part of the settlement.141
This was countered by a number of stakeholders here, 
including the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission, a Professor in Law and a 
former member of the UN Human Rights Committee: 
[T]he language [of the Agreement] is such that you’d be 
a very strange interpreter of the text not to recognise 
that there’s a responsibility [on]... the United Kingdom 
government, which is the sovereign to work towards the 
consideration of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.142
At the end of the day it was a commitment given by the 
UK government in an international treaty […] you can’t 
legally enforce the Treaty commitment but it’s nonetheless 
there.143
Regarding the Irish government’s role, a number of 
interviewees stated the following: 
Perhaps the Irish government should be more vigorous in 
relation to this issue [Bill of Rights] … The Irish government 
could be saying more forthrightly that this is an issue that 
is still here. It is not going to disappear, it’s a commitment 
under the Good Friday Agreement and it needs to be 
addressed and that the Irish government is willing to assist 
in that process. [...] Its job is as a guarantor and it can’t do 
very much on its own but it can put significant pressure on 
the British government and it can also put some pressure 
on the parties locally.144
There is a co-guarantor duty on the Irish government to 
keep pressure on them [British government] as well.145
I have realistic expectations of how involved the Irish 
government are in terms of Northern Ireland issues, at this 
point they have not been particularly engaged I think largely 
to do with the pressures they are under themselves.146
Our view is … the Irish government has failed in its 
responsibilities to press the British.147
It [a Bill of Rights] doesn’t seem to be seen by them (the Irish 
government) as a fundamental issue. And what pressure 
can they apply? What incentives could they give?148
Commenting on both the British and Irish governments’ 
role, the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) representative 
stated:
It’s both the British and Irish [governments] that have 
allowed the Northern Irish parties to decide what the Good 
Friday Agreement looks like; and that’s been the difficulty. 
Rather than saying, ‘no, no, no, this needs to be discussed, 
(as) this was said in the Good Friday Agreement’ they’re so 
happy that the thing [Bill of Rights] has run for so long…. 
sometimes it is difficult to ascertain the difference between 
the British and Irish governments now, they seem to have 
a joint voice on this.149
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150 Interview, 19 February 2014.
151 Answer of the Taoiseach in response to a question by Deputy Eamon Gilmore, leader of the Irish Labour Party, (September 2007 – July 2014) 21 
October 2009, Dáil Debates, Vol 692, No 3, 562 and available at http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/
dail2009102100004?opendocument. Fianna Fáil was in government in 2009. In 2011, the Irish government became a coalition between Fine Gael and the Labour Party. 
In 2009, the ‘British Administration’ was the Labour Party in power in the UK. 
152 Tánaiste, Eamon Gilmore’s address to the SDLP Conference, Armagh, 9 November 2013, available at https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/tags/
browsebyyear/2013/4/. The Tánaiste also raised the Bill of Rights in his speech to the Alliance Party’s Annual Conference, April 2012.
153 Tánaiste, Eamon Gilmore’s address to the British-Irish Association, Cambridge, 7 September 2013, available at https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/tags/
browsebyyear/2013/4/ 
154 Tánaiste, Eamon Gilmore’s address to the Irish Human Rights Commission, Dublin, 28 June 2011, available at https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/tags/
browsebyyear/2011/. In 2013 the Bill of Rights was raised in the Irish parliament on at least 12 occasions. Of those 8 were specifically requesting the Tánaiste update 
the Dáil on what work he had undertaken, usually relating to his communication with the Northern Ireland Secretary of State specifically, regarding the Bill of Rights; on 
the other 4 incidences it was discussed as one of the outstanding elements of the Peace Agreement, available at http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20
authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/datelist?readform&chamber=dail&year=2013 
155 Interview, 25 November 2013.
156 Interview with Brian Gormally, Committee on the Administration of Justice, 17 October 2013.
157 Interview, 19 February 2014.
158 Interview with Alban Maginness, MLA, SDLP, 1 May 2013 [and interview with Anna Lo, Alliance Party, 2 May 2013]. 
The Irish government rejects this view recognising that 
they are ‘co-guarantors of the peace agreement’ and 
have an obligation to work towards the implementation 
of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.150 Speaking in 
2009, the then Taoiseach, Brian Cowen stated:
Regarding the bill of rights for Northern Ireland, I reiterate 
the commitment of the Government to ensure the full and 
effective implementation of all aspect of the Good Friday 
Agreement and the St Andrews Agreement. In that context, 
we attach importance to a specific bill of rights for Northern 
Ireland as envisaged in the Good Friday Agreement. The 
Government has consistently communicated that position 
in contacts with the current British Administration and with 
the Conservative Party Front Bench.151
The former Tánaiste Eamon Gilmore (Tánaiste and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, March 2011 - July 
2014) raised the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights in several 
speeches referring to the need to fulfil all parts of the 
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement:
We need to realise in full the potential of the Agreement 
and all its parts including a bill of rights. We cannot be 
selectively blind to those parts we find difficult. When we 
pick and choose the balance and integrity of the whole is 
picked apart.152
We need to reflect honestly on where there have been 
gaps left or intentions and commitments left unfulfilled ... 
This is why commitments such as the Bill of Rights ... are 
not optional extras. They are fundamental. We neglect it at 
our cost.153
A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland remains a significant 
piece of unfinished work in this area. The Irish Government, 
as co-guarantor of the Agreement, will continue to work to 
ensure that this and all other outstanding provisions from 
the Agreement are fully and effectively implemented.154
Some interviewees opined that by making such 
statements, the Irish government is ‘really play[ing] 
a tokenistic role ... they haven’t really done anything 
substantive on that either’.155 Other interviewees 
recognised that the Irish government are in a different 
position than the British government since the legislative 
process for any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland will 
be in the Westminster Parliament. Another interviewee 
noted ‘the Irish government can’t do legislation in 
Westminster’.156 The Irish government sees itself as 
being on the horns of a dilemma – on the one hand 
wanting to give encouragement to move the process 
forward but on the other hand not over playing their 
hand in this regard.157 As some of the parties noted in 
being facilitative, the Irish government has also got to 
be cognisant of not being too interventionist.158 The role 
of both the British and Irish governments is discussed in 
more detail below.
The Joint Declaration 2003, St Andrews 
Agreement 2006 and Hillsborough 
Agreement 2010
Further provisions for a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights 
and the two governments’ obligations can be found in 
other negotiated settlements. The Joint Declaration by 
the British and Irish governments in April 2003 reiterated 
the British government’s commitment ‘to bringing 
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159 Joint Declaration by the British and Irish Governments, April 2003, Annex 3, para 2.
160 Ibid., Annex 3, para 3. Harvey and Schwartz quote from a previous Chief Commissioner of the NIHRC, Professor Brice Dickson, who suggested that the idea for a 
Bill of Rights Forum was first proposed by the SDLP, B. Dickson, ‘Where now for the Bill of Rights?’, Fortnight, February 2009, 11, quoted in C. Harvey and A. Schwartz, 
‘Designing a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’ (2009) 60(2) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 181, 188.
161 Joint Declaration by the British and Irish Governments, April 2003, Annex 3, para 14.
162 Proposals by the British and Irish Governments for a Comprehensive Agreement, Annex A – Timetable, 8 December 2004, available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/
peace/soc.htm#2004. 
163 Agreement at St Andrews 2006, ‘Human Rights, Equality, Victims and Other Issues’ Annex B; Agreement at St Andrews: ‘We will establish a forum on a Bill of Rights 
and convene its inaugural meeting in December 2006’ available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136651/st_andrews_
agreement-2.pdf. 
164 Northern Ireland Office, Consultation Paper, A Forum on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (14 November 2006). 
165 Northern Ireland Office, ‘A Forum on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Response to consultation’, 12 December 2006, quoted in Bill of Rights Forum, Final Report: 
Recommendations to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (31 March 2008) 6.
166 Bill of Rights Forum, Final Report: Recommendations to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (31 March 2008).
167 The Hillsborough Agreement was about completing devolution of policing and justice powers, available at http://www.nidirect.gov.uk/castle_final_
agreement15__2_-3.pdf
168 D. Foster and O. Gay, ‘The Hillsborough Agreement’ House of Commons, Standard Note:
SN/PC/05350 (18 March 2010) 6, available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05350/the-hillsborough-agreement
169 Joint Statement by Gordon Brown, then British Prime Minister, and Brian Cowen, then Taoiseach, the Irish Prime Minister, relating to the Agreement on the 
devolution of policing and justice powers (4 February 2010); available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/pmo/gbbc040210.htm
forward legislation at Westminster where required to 
give effect to rights supplementary to the ECHR to reflect 
the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland’.159 The 
Declaration then makes reference to a Bill of Rights 
Forum: 
The British Government will work with the parties to 
facilitate the response to the NIHRC’s proposal for a Round 
Table forum on the Bill of Rights, involving the parties 
and civic society. Subject to the agreement arrived at in 
the Implementation Group, it is envisaged that the round 
table forum will have an independent chair and its own 
secretariat, will be as inclusive as possible of Assembly 
parties and civic society, will appropriately involve the 
NIHRC, mindful of its statutory role, and will be adequately 
supported and resourced. It is envisaged that the work of 
the Round Table Forum will be forwarded to the NIHRC 
before it gives its final advice to the Secretary of State.160
The reference to an Implementation Group, in this 
Declaration, highlights that discussions were taking 
place between the parties to the Agreement on how best 
to take the issue forward. Representatives from the two 
governments also pledged to support these meetings 
ensuring ‘that the momentum of delivery in [this] area 
is maintained’.161 It was this Implementation Group that 
helped to draft the terms of reference for the subsequent 
Roundtable Forum. A further commitment to move the 
establishment of a Bill of Rights Forum is contained 
in the proposals for a Comprehensive Agreement 
published by the two governments in December 2004. 
Annex A details actions to be taken by the government 
in the context of an agreement and stated: ‘Secretary 
of State further consults with parties and announces 
arrangements for an independently facilitated forum on 
a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland including details of 
independent facilitator’.162 The establishment of such a 
Forum was then included in the St. Andrews Agreement 
2006, an agreement between the Executive’s political 
parties and the two governments.163 The significance of 
this Agreement is that, unlike the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement which the DUP opposed, the DUP committed 
itself to the implementation of the St Andrews Agreement. 
Following consultation on the composition and mandate 
of the Bill of Rights Forum in November 2006, the Forum 
was established on 12 December 2006.164 It commenced 
its work on 18 December 2006165 and published its report 
to the NIHRC in March 2008.166 The political parties’ 
response to its report will be examined separately.
Following the St Andrews Agreement, the DUP and Sinn 
Féin signed the Hillsborough Agreement, February 2010 
restoring devolution to the Northern Ireland Assembly.167 
While the two governments were not signatories of this 
Agreement, the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown 
welcomed the Agreement as ‘a significant and defining 
moment’.168 Both governments also issued a joint 
statement: 
As the joint guarantors of the Good Friday and St Andrews 
Agreements which provide the essential framework for 
peace and stability, we welcome the agreement that has 
been reached by the parties to complete devolution .... 
The two Governments fully support and stand over this 
agreement. We are committed to working, as appropriate, 
to ensure its faithful implementation.169
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170 Agreement at Hillsborough Castle, 5 February 2010, s.5(3), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hillsborough-castle-agreement 
171 Interview with Alban Maginness, MLA, SDLP, 1 May 2013.
172 Interview with Alban Maginness, MLA, SDLP, 1 May 2013.
173 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Article 31:1 ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. Article 31:2. ‘The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: […] Article 31:3. ‘There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement 
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.’
174 Commentary by the Government on the relationship between the two bodies, contained in the consultation response, personal correspondence with the former 
Director of the CAJ, 12 April 2007, in A. Smith, A Dialogic Approach to Constitutionalising Equality: Lessons from South Africa and Canada for Northern Ireland 
(unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Ulster 2007) 245.
175 Civil society representation included 2 seats for trade unions, 2 for employers, 2 for churches, 1 for the human rights NGO sector and 7 for the community and 
voluntary sector. The political parties comprised 3 seats for the DUP, Sinn Féin, Ulster Unionist Party and the SDLP and 2 seats for the Alliance Party. This composition 
was modelled on the Preparation for Government sub-committee. For a list of the Forum membership see http://www.billofrightsforum.org/index/forum.htm. 
176 Chris Sidoti, an Australian human rights lawyer, former Director of the International Service for Human Rights and a former Australian Human Rights Commissioner, 
was appointed in March 2007. 
177 Bill of Rights Forum, Final Report: Recommendations to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (31 March 2008) 6. 
The significance of this Agreement was that it stated that 
‘a working group will be set up and will submit a report 
by the end of March 2010 on any ‘outstanding issues’ 
from the St Andrews Agreement. The Agreement further 
stated that ‘within four weeks of the working group’s 
initial report, the First Minister and deputy First Minister 
will agree a programme to carry out the working group’s 
agreed outcomes.’170 Although a Bill of Rights is one of 
those ‘outstanding issues’, as far as we understand, a 
Bill of Rights was not amongst the issues discussed and 
agreed by the working group. 
Three important points arise from these negotiated 
settlements. Firstly, the proposal for a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland was viewed by both governments as an 
integral part of the constitutional settlement in Northern 
Ireland; secondly, there was a stated obligation on behalf 
of the British government to bring forward legislation to 
implement a Bill of Rights; thirdly, these Agreements 
cannot be separated since they are viewed politically 
as ‘collective agreements’.171 In addition to this, the 
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement was overwhelmingly 
endorsed by the Northern Ireland populace and ‘has 
the agreement of both governments in terms of an 
international Agreement, [it] cannot be ignored; it has to 
be accepted’.172 It is also the case that although one of 
the Executive parties in Northern Ireland did not sign up 
to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, it did agree to the 
proposals as specified under the St Andrews Agreement. 
Further under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, to which the UK is a party, the UK has 
the obligation to fulfil its promises in good faith, and in 
accordance with its subsequent actions.173 This could be 
interpreted that the UK government has not fulfilled its 
promises ‘to legislate’ since, in the terms of the Vienna 
Convention, no ‘subsequent actions’ have followed its 
consultation on the NIHRC advice. As part of its promise 
to legislate, as set out in the Joint Declaration 2003, the 
UK government would have been expected to set out its 
own proposals following the receipt of the consultation 
responses on the NIHRC’s advice to the Secretary 
of State in 2008. It is also the case that there was no 
government’s response to the Bill of Rights Forum’s 
report despite the UK government stating at that time, 
as noted below, that it would ‘bear in mind the Forum’s 
findings’174 as part of its deliberative process.
Bill of Rights Forum
The Bill of Rights Forum was comprised of 28 members 
with 14 representatives from civil society and 14 
representatives from the main political parties175 and 
was chaired by an independent human rights expert, 
Chris Sidoti.176 The Forum’s terms of reference were 
consistent with the NIHRC’s mandate as set out in the 
Belfast/ Good Friday Agreement:
to produce agreed recommendations to inform the 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s advice to 
Government on the scope for defining, in Westminster 
legislation, rights supplementary to those in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, to reflect the particular 
circumstances of Northern Ireland, drawing as appropriate 
on international human rights instruments and experience. 
These additional rights to reflect the principles of mutual 
respect for the identity and ethos of both communities and 
parity of esteem, and – taken together with the ECHR – to 
constitute a Bill Rights for Northern Ireland.177
Commenting on the Bill of Rights Forum, the UK 
government stated:
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178 Commentary by the Government on the relationship between the two bodies, contained in the consultation response, personal correspondence with the former 
Director of the CAJ, 12 April 2007, in A. Smith, A Dialogic Approach to Constitutionalising Equality: Lessons from South Africa and Canada for Northern Ireland 
(unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Ulster 2007) 245. The NIHRC were approved as official observers at the Forum along with the Equality Commission for Northern 
Ireland, the Human Rights Consortium and Northern Ireland Commissioner for Children and Young People.
179 Bill of Rights Forum, Final Report: Recommendations to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (31 March 2008).
180 Ibid., 25.
181 The two Unionist parties, the DUP and the UUP, voted against the vast majority of rights proposed arguing that the rights were not particular to the circumstances of 
Northern Ireland, that they were covered under the Human Rights Act 1998 or that they were rights that should not be justiciable. 
182 Bill of Rights Forum, Final Report: Recommendations to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (31 March 2008) 76. 
183 Ibid., 80.
184 Ibid., 64. There was also agreement on technical provisions such as limitations to rights (Ibid., 165–6), standing (Ibid., 172–3), remedies (Ibid., 178), non-diminution 
from international standards that the UK is a party to. This means that the Bill of Rights cannot undermine existing international and domestic human rights treaties (Ibid., 
179), and government support for the implementation of the Bill of Rights (Ibid., 185).
185 DUP and UUP Statements of position state: ‘With the exception of clause 3, this proposal does not meaningfully supplement HRA Article 11 nor – in the case of 
reference to trade unions – is it relevant to the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland’. Bill of Rights Forum, Final Report: Recommendations to the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (31 March 2008) 65. 
186 Sinn Féin and SDLP were in favour of protecting ‘minorities’ rather than ‘minorities and communities’. This was the same approach taken by civil society. The 
Alliance Party opposed the use of ‘minorities’ only and wanted ‘communities’ also protected, Bill of Rights Forum, Final Report: Recommendations to the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (31 March 2008) 73. Further the Alliance Party strongly opposed the clause relating to data collection 
on the basis that it enabled public authorities to identify a person as belonging to a particular group, Bill of Rights Forum, Final Report: Recommendations to the Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (31 March 2008) 70. 
187 The Alliance Party opposed the right to social security being included, stating concerns that this may create a disparity with the UK; they also opposed the 
introduction of a clause to protect people who were being evicted from becoming homeless, Bill of Rights Forum, Final Report: Recommendations to the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (31 March 2008) 102, 86.
188 Interview with Alban Maginness, MLA, SDLP, 1 May 2013.
189 Interview with Vincent Parker, Special Adviser to the deputy First Minister, Sinn Féin, 7 June 2013.
190 Emma Little, Special Adviser to the First Minister. Interview with Jonathan Bell, MLA and Emma Little, DUP, 21 May 2013.
It will of course be open to the Government to bear in mind 
the Forum’s findings when considering how to respond 
to the NIHRC’s advice. The Government welcomes the 
opportunity for debate that the Forum will provide and 
believes that clear and public agreement by the Forum 
will provide a strong basis for building widespread support 
for its findings across the community. But the statutory 
obligation to provide advice to the Secretary of State 
remains with the NIHRC.178
When the Bill of Rights Forum handed over its 245 page 
report to the NIHRC in March 2008,179 it concluded that the 
Forum was unable to reach a ‘clear and public agreement’ 
and that it had instead presented a range of options as 
part of its findings. On the issue of what constituted the 
‘particular circumstances’ of Northern Ireland agreement 
between the parties could not be found which was also 
the case on the rights ‘supplementary to the European 
Convention on Human Rights’.180 Of the 40 substantive 
rights proposed only three of these had cross-party 
agreement181 and even these were limited in their extent. 
The three rights that were agreed by all parties were as 
follows: that individuals in Northern Ireland should be 
guaranteed the right to identify themselves as British or 
Irish or both and hold dual citizenship;182 that parents had 
the right to educate their children ‘in conformity with their 
cultural, linguistic, pedagogical, philosophical, religious 
and other convictions’,183 and that ‘freedom of peaceful 
assembly includes the right to participate in assemblies, 
processions, protests and parades’.184 Not all elements 
of the latter two rights were agreed as issues over 
funding for and exclusion from education were disputed, 
and in relation to the right of peaceful assembly dispute 
remained over the parallel right of association.185
Cultural and identity rights created a divergence of 
opinion186 as did social and economic rights.187 Sinn Féin 
and SDLP agreed that ‘we [the political parties] should 
be moving forward on the basis of what the Forum has 
produced, what political parties have done in this relation 
to the Forum’188 and that the ‘Forum’s report [was] all 
fairly conclusive’.189
However, the Unionist parties did not share these views. 
The Special Adviser to the First Minister (DUP) stated, 
‘the [DUP] certainly couldn’t buy into the type of thing 
that came out of the Forum’.190 A representative from 
civil society admitted that: 
we knew that in the year long Forum we were coming out 
with far too many [rights], that the list was too long.. But 
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193 C. Harvey and A. Schwartz, ‘Designing a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’ (2009) 60(2) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 181, 189.
194 Interview with Patrick Corrigan, Amnesty UK, 6 November 2013.
195 C. Harvey and A. Schwartz, ‘Designing a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’ (2009) 60(2) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 181, 189.
196 Interview with Patricia McKeown, UNISON, 6 December 2013. The First Minister is Peter Robinson (DUP); the deputy First Minister is Martin McGuiness (Sinn Féin).
197 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Advice to the Secretary of State (10 December 2008) 13.
198 For an analysis of the drafting process see A. Smith, ‘The Drafting Process of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’ (2004) Public Law 526 and C. Harvey and A. 
Schwartz, ‘Designing a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’ (2009) 60(2) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 181. The NIHRC also contains a useful summary of how the 
Commission approached its task in the final advice report, Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Advice to the Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland (10 December 2008) 10-13.
199 This date was chosen to mark the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
200 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Advice to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (10 December 2008).
201 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, ‘A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Next Steps Response to the Northern Ireland Office’, February 2010, 7.
202 The recommendations include: the right to life; right to liberty and security, right to a fair trial and no punishment without trial; right to marriage or civil partnership; 
right to equality and prohibition of discrimination; democratic rights; education rights; freedom of movement; freedom from violence, exploitation and harassment; 
nevertheless it was the expression of this dynamic process 
that had not happened before. So it wasn’t a bad thing.191
Although the Forum did not lead to a consensus on 
the content of a future Bill of Rights, many of those 
participating agreed that it was useful in the sense 
of getting politicians around the table to talk. As the 
Chairperson concluded later, ‘they [the politicians] 
learned the perspectives – both rational and prejudiced 
– of others in the community with whom they might 
never previously had such conversations’.192 This view 
is echoed by Harvey:
The Forum was helpful, however, in gauging support for 
the alternate proposals and clarifying the positions of the 
political parties and civil society groups. It might also be 
argued that the process itself was of value, particularly 
in bringing political parties and civil society together to 
discuss human rights.193
However, one interviewee noted that while he found the 
process to be 
an interesting exercise and certainly what went on at a 
Committee stage or in terms of the working groups, the 
discussions were useful, informative, educative [...] when 
push came to shove in the final report people backed-away, 
politicians backed away from signing up the stuff they had 
actually, apparently, been interested in or engaged in at 
the working group stage and because there was no end 
process in sight, there was no point, from the political 
negotiation perspective of showing their cards too early or 
giving away too much.194
The concern that parties might be accused of showing 
their cards too early is an important one and might help 
to explain why some of the political parties were not 
prepared to seek consensus during the Forum. This 
phase was considered by some of the parties as the 
opening of discussions on these issues, recognising that 
the NIHRC had yet to produce its advice. In keeping with 
these ‘divergent and competing approaches’,195 when 
a proposal to return to a Bill of Rights Forum process 
was mooted in early 2013, the First Minister rejected the 
proposal while the deputy First Minister supported it.196 
Although the process resulted in little political consensus, 
the NIHRC welcomed the Forum’s findings and agreed 
to pay ‘rigorous attention to the proposals contained in 
the Forum Report, with each of its proposals considered 
in detail’.197 The process by which it did this is outlined 
below.
Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission’s Advice
Following an inclusive and transparent eight-year 
drafting process,198 the NIHRC fulfilled its statutory 
obligation under the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 
on the 10 December 2008199 in submitting its advice 
to the Secretary of State.200 The advice, while not a 
‘legislative draft’201 sets out detailed recommendations 
on what rights should be included in a Bill of Rights 
for Northern Ireland. The Commission put forward 78 
recommendations for new substantive rights in addition 
to others relating to enforcement and implementation. 
The recommendations comprise a range of rights 
including economic, social and cultural rights as well as 
civil and political rights.202 The Commission also sets out 
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the methodology utilised in the production of its advice. 
Despite laying out the rigorous steps it had taken to test 
its advice, the NIHRC was criticised by those associated 
with political unionism on these same procedural 
grounds. They argued that the NIHRC should have 
adopted a narrower interpretation of its mandate when 
it sought to ‘consult and advise’ on a Bill of Rights.203 In 
choosing ‘not to confine itself to advising on the scope 
for defining the requisite rights but to advise on the 
requisite rights themselves’,204  these critics also took 
the view that the NIHRC went beyond its mandate and 
‘was not asked to draft a Bill of Rights (or something 
that looked uncannily like it)’.205 The other parties, such 
as SDLP and Sinn Féin, took the opposite view. They 
favoured the NIHRC’s interpretation of its mandate and 
agreed that the mandate, as outlined in the Agreement, 
was intended to be broad.206
On substantive issues, the political parties were also 
divided as to whether the Commission went beyond its 
remit by including socio-economic rights in its advice. 
This issue arose in relation to how the phrase in the 
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, namely, ‘the particular 
circumstances of Northern Ireland’, was interpreted. 
Given the wide range of views on what the particular 
circumstances meant to the political parties, which had 
been the subject of much dispute in the Bill of Rights 
Forum, the lack of consensus on this issue following 
the Commission’s advice was unsurprising.207 Political 
unionism argued that the NIHRC had exceeded its remit 
by including rights that did not reflect ‘the particular 
circumstances of Northern Ireland’:
It [the NIHRC] was not mandated to devise a new bill of 
rights or to change our socio-economic context through the 
creation of numerous new rights.208
[the words of the phrase ‘the particular circumstances of 
Northern Ireland’] do not open the door to economic, social 
and cultural rights.209
In submitting evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs 
Committee (NIAC), Daphne Trimble, a member of 
the UUP and former member of the NIHRC who had 
dissented from the Commission’s advice, stated:
If you look at the proposals around the socio-economic 
rights, the areas that those are addressing are by and 
large common societal problems right across the UK; if you 
look at housing, that is a problem right across the UK, it 
is not specific to Northern Ireland, ditto the environment, 
and rights to social security. So it seems to me to be rather 
difficult to come up with a proposal that there should be 
rights around these areas in Northern Ireland when there 
are not similar rights in the rest of the UK.210
On the other hand, the SDLP, Sinn Féin and Alliance 
Party alongside NGOs, community groups, trade unions 
and other civil society organisations reject the view that 
the NIHRC exceeded its remit and state that socio-
economic rights must be included as they do reflect 
the ‘particular circumstances of Northern Ireland’.211 
The Alliance Party’s MP was supportive of the NIHRC’s 
advice, stating that this is the best document to start any 
future discussions about a Bill of Rights.212 Sinn Féin’s 
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representative believed ‘a Bill of Rights should be fully 
inclusive, the maximum protections, as envisioned in the 
Commission’s advice’.213 The SDLP’s spokesperson on 
human rights also agreed that the overall work which led 
to the Commission’s advice should be considered: ‘we 
should be moving forward on the basis of … what the 
NIHRC has done’.214
Speaking specifically about the inclusion of socio-
economic rights, these parties argue that the NIHRC was 
correct to include such rights. The SDLP spokesperson 
stated:
had we [Northern Ireland] had a [Bill of Rights] in the 
1960s whenever people like Sheelagh Murnaghan were 
advocating a Bill of Rights, we might have avoided some of 
the issues that exploded into the civil rights campaign and 
in particular socio-economic rights … one of the principle 
problems … was the allocation and distribution of housing 
and if we’d had them – [socio-economic rights] we might 
not have had that problem or we could have managed that 
problem differently … I say the same in relation to jobs. 
If we had a human rights charter in relation to the area 
of job discrimination and equal opportunity we could have 
perhaps avoided some of those problems because job 
discrimination was another aggravating factor that gave rise 
to the civil rights campaign and the Troubles ultimately.215
The same politician suggested that: ‘political rights 
[need] to be protected and that’s to be the core, and then 
[include] the outer core of socio-economic rights … the 
marriage of those two things I think is important …’216 The 
Alliance Party, also in favour of socio-economic rights, 
adopts the approach that: ‘there is a need for socio-
economic rights but I think a more minimalist approach 
to that aspect of it is likely to gain more traction’.217 
Sinn Féin goes further regarding socio-economic rights 
as essential to the NIHRC’s advice and rejected any 
decoupling of one set of rights from another: 
Our view all along is that the Bill... should be fully inclusive 
of economic, social and political rights [reflecting] the 
particular circumstances extend beyond the very narrow 
view that the British government have of the conflict here 
and the broader view needs to be included. That includes 
housing, employment ... as envisioned in the NIHRC’s 
advice.218
While the NIHRC’s advice did not gain cross-party 
support, procedurally or substantively, civil society 
and those working in the human rights field view the 
NIHRC’s process and advice as a ‘meticulous, fair-
minded process and certainly wasn’t a wish-list. Every 
single clause was examined in great detail as to its 
relevance to the project’.219 Indeed, some commentators 
have pointed out that there is a third school of thought 
from those NGOs’ arguing that far from being a ‘wish 
list’, the NIHRC’s advice ‘didn’t go far enough’.220 Such 
views tend to be ‘neglected’221 and are ‘often drowned 
out’222 by the first school of thought, namely those who 
argue that the NIHRC adopted an approach that was 
too maximalist. Those who favour a more minimalist 
approach tend to be from political unionism, bringing 
its own implications for progressing the discussions 
any further. As Harvey states: ‘given the power-sharing 
dynamics of political life in Northern Ireland, the notional 
‘veto power’ was always likely to prove decisive’.223 
The importance of ‘veto power’ and the primary ‘veto 
players’224 in progressing a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland will be examined in the following chapter. The 
next section examines the Northern Ireland Office’s 
response to the NIHRC’s advice and the way in which it 
carried out its consultation process.
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Haysot, Pieterse, Mureinik, Hunt, Fredman and O’Connell, Nolan, Porter and Langford. This is by no means an exhaustive list. The 1992 issue of the South African 
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Northern Ireland Office’s Consultation Paper
The Northern Ireland Office (NIO) published its 
consultation document to the NIHRC’s advice225 in 
November 2009, almost a year after the submission of 
advice. The 116 page document adopted a minimalist 
approach to a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland226 arguing 
that most of the rights proposed by the NIHRC were 
already adequately protected by existing legislation, 
policy or practice227 or were not specific to Northern 
Ireland. In addition, the NIO sought to append these rights 
to a national discussion on a possible UK Bill of Rights 
(see below).228 In relation to socio-economic rights, the 
NIO decided to focus on the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health without explaining its rationale for 
singling out this socio-economic right as opposed to 
employment or housing.229 In its consultation paper, the 
British government230 stated that it is a ‘far-reaching’ right 
and to enforce such a right in courts would be a ‘step 
that ...goes far beyond the service provision’.231 As far 
as the government was concerned, the primary reason 
why such a right, and socio-economic rights in general, 
was seen as ‘far-reaching’ is related to the ‘separation 
of powers’ argument – that is that the separate decision 
making authority of the Executive, the Legislature and 
the Judiciary has to be maintained in relation to socio-
economic issues.232 There are also associated concerns 
relating to the legitimacy and competence of the judiciary 
to deal with issues relating to socio-economic rights. 
In this context, the government argued that as such 
rights have monetary implications requiring expenditure 
decisions, it was therefore inappropriate and illegitimate 
for courts to determine such issues. As Cecile Fabre 
argues:
...Judges, it is thought, should not get involved in making 
policy and in allocating resources to individuals, first, 
because they would be encroaching upon the prerogative 
of the elected representatives of the people, and secondly, 
because even if one does not think that democracy 
should have pre-eminence over social justice, judges are 
not the best placed, institutionally, to make those kind of 
decisions.233
In an earlier paper, on Rights and Responsibilities, the 
government specifically stated that justiciable/legally 
enforceable, socio-economic rights would impinge on 
the principle of ‘democratic accountability’ as well as 
the separation of powers between the three branches 
of government.234 However, as discussed in detail in 
chapter 1, the purpose of a Bill of Rights is to enhance 
democracy rather than weaken it. Furthermore, the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights235 states in General Comment No. 9:
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[W]hile the respective competences of the various branches 
of government must be respected, it is appropriate to 
acknowledge that courts are generally already involved 
in a considerable range of matters which have important 
resource implications. The adoption of a rigid classification 
of economic, social and cultural rights which puts them, by 
definition, beyond the reach of the courts would thus be 
arbitrary and incompatible with the principle that the two 
sets of human rights are indivisible and interdependent. It 
would also drastically curtail the capacity of the courts to 
protect the rights of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups in society.236
In fact in jurisdictions that have enshrined socio-
economic rights, and even in those where such rights 
have not been inserted into the Constitution, emerging 
jurisprudence demonstrates the competence and 
alacrity of the courts to enforce these rights.237 A NGO 
representative, in the field of human rights, argues 
that ‘sensible and just politicians have nothing to fear 
from [justiciable] economic and social rights... elected 
politicians are not elected dictators. They too are bound 
by the rule of law and the need to take decisions in a 
fair, just and equal way. [..] Human rights can be used 
[..] as a structure or framework for making the decisions 
themselves.238 In this context, Tapscott has reasoned 
that Bills of Rights allow those who ‘are passionate 
or desperate enough to seek change through legal 
means’.239 
In addition, principles developed by groups of experts and 
international organisations provide useful explanations 
of the nature and scope of states’ obligations under 
Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter the ICESCR).240 
The Committee on the ICESCR (the CESCR) in its 
Concluding Observations on the UK has corrected 
the perception that economic and social rights are 
programmatic aspirational principles which are 
not justiciable and has confirmed the indivisibility, 
interrelatedness and interdependence of all rights and 
the justiciability of these rights.241 More specifically, the 
CESCR recommended in their Concluding Observations 
on the UK that such rights be included ‘without delay’242 
in a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland:
The Committee strongly recommends the inclusion of 
effective protection for economic, social and cultural rights, 
consistent with the provisions of the Covenant, in any bill of 
rights enacted for Northern Ireland.243
The Council of Europe Experts, commenting on the 
Northern Ireland process, also recommended the 
inclusion of socio-economic rights in a Bill of Rights 
recognising that ‘economic and social rights assist 
in promoting social cohesion and stability’.244 Former 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise 
Arbour, warned the British government not to ‘neglect’ 
economic, social and cultural rights’ particularly since 
Northern Ireland is transitioning from conflict.245 Louise 
Arbour further cautioned that: ‘Not actively protecting 
and promoting economic, social and cultural rights 
reflects the hidden assumption that these rights are not 
entitlements but aspirational expectations to be fulfilled 
by market-driven or political processes alone’.246 Despite 
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repetitive explanations of how these rights operate, 
there is still much confusion over their application. The 
right to work and other rights such as the right to social 
security, right to food, education, health and the right to 
an adequate standard of living does not mean a right to 
a particular job or the right to a specific medication, or 
the right to particular accommodation. Rather, it is about 
the right to have access to these rights and it is this 
issue, of accessibility without discrimination that reflects 
the language of the ICESCR. For example, the ICESCR 
states that the right to social security: 
encompasses the right to access and maintain benefits 
... without discrimination in order to secure protection, 
inter alia, from (a) lack of work-related income caused 
by sickness, disability, maternity, employment injury, 
unemployment, old age, or death of a family member; (b) 
unaffordable access to health care; (c) insufficient family 
support, particularly for children and adult dependents.247
As the UK has already signed and ratified the ICESCR, 
this means that the inclusion of socio-economic rights in 
a Bill of Rights is ‘safely within the framework of existing 
UK international obligations’.248 The obligations that 
these rights would bring at a domestic level are already 
being carried out at the international level. In this context, 
it is also worth noting that the NIHRC was mandated to 
draw as appropriate on international instruments and 
experience. 
The response from the Chairperson of the Bill of Rights 
Forum to the NIO Consultation document highlights the 
NIO’s failure to understand the purpose and nature of 
a Bill of Rights.249 Responding to the NIO’s argument 
that as some of the rights are already covered in existing 
legislation, policy, codes or practice, Sidoti argued that:
A statute that deals with a right or even a few rights is no 
substitute for a comprehensive Bill of Rights. Certainly 
‘policy and administrative schemes’ are of no value 
whatsoever in the protection of human rights as they do not 
have the force of law and can be amended and abolished 
as easily as they were established.250
Similarly, the NIHRC noted that the:
Government does not seem to have realised that the fact 
that a protection currently offered by a code of practice, 
order or statute does not provide stable and enduring basis 
for that protection. The protection afforded can be amended 
easily: for example, the Police and Criminal Evidence 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (on which Government relies 
to make a number of arguments) was amended in 2007. 
As such, protection in codes and secondary legislation 
is not pertinent to the question of whether that protection 
should be enshrined at a constitutional level in a Bill of 
Rights. The Commission is left wondering if Government is 
actually aware of the constitutional significance of such an 
instrument and rationale for its creation.251
In addition to the separation of powers argument, the 
NIO’s rationale for rejecting parts of the NIHRC ’s advice 
relates to the view that these would create additional 
rights for Northern Ireland that are not available in the 
rest of the United Kingdom. The NIO’s Consultation 
paper stated:
[I]t is apparent that many of the proposals made by the 
NIHRC in its Advice are closely related to this on-going 
debate [referring to a possible UK-wide Bill of Rights] 
and, if taken forward, they would need to be considered 
in this context … The Government’s initial assessment 
is that over half of the rights proposed in the NIHRC’s 
Advice are equally as relevant to the people of England, 
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Scotland and Wales as they are to the people of Northern 
Ireland and, therefore, fall to be considered in the UK-
wide context.252
Such ‘disparity of human rights across the United 
Kingdom’253 would, according to the NIO, either be 
‘unworkable in practice, or could give rise to unjustified 
inequalities across the UK’.254 Commenting on this 
argument, a representative from the trade unions 
argued: 
So most of the decisions that are taken are not about 
us at all. They are simply about whether other people in 
Britain might make that demand as well and use us as 
an example of, ‘if they’ve got it – why haven’t we?255
Experience elsewhere256 shows it is possible to have 
different rights in different regions. In Canada for 
example, several provinces such as Quebec, Alberta and 
Saskatchewan have their own statutory Bill of Rights in 
addition to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(1982). The latter applies to all levels (federal/national 
and provincial) and does not contain socio-economic 
rights whereas Quebec’s Bill of Rights includes such 
rights. It is possible therefore to have different rights in 
different parts operating at the national or provincial or 
devolved level. As a former Chief Commissioner of the 
NIHRC reasoned:
each separate legal system within the UK should be free 
to devise an additional Bill of Rights going further than the 
national Bill of Rights has gone and dealing with particular 
matters that are of concern to that legal system.257
The NIO’s view also contrasts with the UK government’s 
Green Paper highlighting the need to keep the Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights discussion/process separate from 
that of the UK debate:
the Government does not wish the public debate about 
a UK instrument to detract from the process relating to 
a potential Bill relating to the particular circumstances of 
Northern Ireland.258
However, the NIO’s Consultation document does not 
explain which particular circumstances it is referring to 
that would justify a separate Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland:
The Government has made clear that it sees no 
incompatibility between a possible UK Bill of Rights and 
Responsibilities and a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, 
reflecting the particular circumstances of Northern 
Ireland.259
The NIO’s approach to this phrase has been criticised 
as failing to provide a detailed methodology explaining 
the factors that form the basis to identify the ‘particular 
circumstances’.260 In stark contrast to the NIHRC’s 
comprehensive approach, no such methodology is 
provided by government. Thus, statements regarding 
‘particular circumstances’ are inconclusive and do 
not provide sufficient detail to enable a ‘meaningful’ 
response.261 Likewise, the issue of merging a Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights process/debate with a possible 
UK Bill of Rights created a diversity of opinion amongst 
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the political parties sustaining the political vacuum that 
already existed. 
Those opposed to the merger argue that the discussions 
on the different Bills of Rights have emerged from 
different backgrounds. The proposal for a Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights is derived from the Belfast/Good 
Friday Agreement, recognised as an international peace 
treaty which responded to the needs of a society making 
the transition from conflict. As the NIHRC noted:
There was no mention of a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities 
in the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement 1998, the Joint 
Declaration of 2003 or the St Andrews Agreement of 2006. 
It is therefore extremely problematic from the perspective 
of an international peace treaty, as well as the resultant 
public expectation, for Government to be suggesting 
now that because some of the rights needed in Northern 
Ireland might also be needed elsewhere in the UK that this 
jurisdiction will have to wait until that happens.262
This view is also endorsed by the Human Rights 
Consortium:
[F]rom our perspective we were worried about the Bill of 
Rights and questions about having a UK wide Bill of Rights 
that didn’t take account of local circumstances here, there 
was provision in the Agreement, the Bill of Rights process 
had been here ... that’s in the roots and origins and 
framework of the Agreement.263
Those opposing the merger argue that the motivation 
behind the proposal for a UK Bill of Rights is different 
– aligned to politicians with a specific political agenda 
and responding to concerns over decision making at 
the European Court of Human Rights. Experts in human 
rights have interpreted this as an attempt to undermine 
rather than enhance human rights protection.264 In this 
context, the absence of civic society involvement in 
the UK discussions is also noted – in contrast to the 
extensive public participation exercise undertaken by 
the NIHRC as part of the process of drafting its advice.
Some of the political parties also rejected the idea of 
subjugating the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights into a UK 
Bill of Rights. In their response to the NIO’s consultation 
paper, Sinn Féin stated that the UK Bill of Rights was 
a separate issue and ‘only full decoupling of these two 
processes’ would be acceptable to them.265 The SDLP 
highlighted that they were unhappy with the way in 
which the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights was addressed 
alongside the UK Bill of Rights: ‘the idea that some of this 
can be reduced to a subsection of a UK-wide instrument 
is disrespectful of the extensive process here and the 
circumstances in the North’.266 The Alliance Party’s 
response noted that they were open to the idea of a 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights being contained in a UK 
wide Bill of Rights but that the particular circumstances 
of Northern Ireland would need to be addressed 
appropriately.267
The DUP’s response showed it was unconvinced by a 
need for a UK Bill of Rights but stated that if a UK Bill of 
Rights was to happen, it should include a section relevant 
for Northern Ireland.268 The UUP’s response supported 
the idea of a UK Bill of Rights and argued that a merger of 
the Northern Ireland process into a separate sub-section 
of the UK Bill would be most appropriate.269 One of the 
members of the UK Bill of Rights Commission (tasked 
with advising on the UK process) specifically focused 
on Northern Ireland and endorsed different rights for 
the devolved regions in the UK.270 Speaight argued that 
‘there has been explicit and formal recognition of the 
desirability of a distinct Northern Ireland Bills of Rights271 
and cautioned that if there was to be a UK Bill of Rights, 
devolved legislatures should be able to legislate for 
specific rights within their jurisdictions.272 He continued: 
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Consideration of future rights protection in the UK should 
take account of the reality that Northern Ireland [..] will 
have [their] own laws on rights and that these laws will 
not always match either each other or the laws at national 
level.273
The Joint Committee on Human Rights also supported 
the idea of rights being ‘asymmetrical’ at national and 
sub-national levels.274 However, it was not just on this 
aspect that the political parties’ differed. The two main 
Unionist parties used their response primarily to state 
their strong opposition to the NIHRC’s advice. The 
DUP did not mention the NIHRC’s advice; rather the 
party spoke of ‘proponents of an all-encompassing Bill 
of Rights for Northern Ireland’.275 They believed the 
proposals ‘would remove decisions from the people, 
waste public money and distance Northern Ireland from 
the rest of the UK’.276 The UUP concluded that it ‘finds 
itself broadly supporting the consultation document’s 
rejection of the NIHRC’s proposals’.277
The other parties elected to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly took the opposite view, including the 
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP). The PUP rejected the 
consultation paper on the same grounds that the two 
main Unionist parties supported it and criticised the NIO 
for the manner in which it had produced its consultation. 
The PUP argued that:
the document presented for consultation does not reflect 
the feedback, demands and needs of the process managed 
by the NIHRC’ and with the other parties it urged for the 
NIO to re-consider its proposals.278
The PUP stated that it hoped ‘to see a more accurate 
representation of these issues as the NIO seeks to 
pursue a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’.279 The party 
further reiterated its support for a strong Bill of Rights that 
would include social and economic rights.280 Similarly 
Sinn Féin and the SDLP rejected the NIO’s paper on the 
grounds that it did not reflect the NIHRC’s advice; both 
parties explained their views on why socio-economic 
rights were an important element and how these rights 
were particular to Northern Ireland.281
The Alliance Party’s response to the consultation, 
similar to that of Sinn Féin and SDLP, set out some of 
its own views on what they believed a Northern Ireland 
Bill of Rights should contain. It did not reject the NIO’s 
consultation but stated ‘that the NIO proposals may miss 
an opportunity to provide a more robust set of rights 
protections for Northern Ireland’.282 They also noted 
that a Bill of Rights was meant to be a constitutional 
document, arguing that:
Consideration of some potential rights seems to have been 
dismissed on the grounds that existing or future policies 
may deal with the matters under consideration. This misses 
the point regarding the potential need to entrench some 
key principles relating to policy-making.283
Finally they went further than all parties by advocating 
further public engagement:
The parameters of the consultation have also been 
constrained through the NIO effectively ruling out some 
matters. The public should have the opportunity to comment 
on other options even if the view of the NIO is at this stage 
is not well disposed towards them.284
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[UK] Commission on a Bill of Rights
In March 2011 a Commission on a Bill of Rights (for 
the UK) was established. Its aims were to ‘investigate 
the creation of a UK Bill of Rights that incorporates 
and builds on all our obligations under the European 
Convention […] ensures these rights continue to be 
enshrined in UK law, and protects and extend our 
liberties.’285 This Commission was established as a 
compromise by the coalition government in response to 
the Conservative party’s wish to dilute the Human Rights 
Act and the Liberal Democrat party’s wish to maintain 
it. The Commission failed to reach an agreement on 
whether or not the UK should have its own Bill of Rights. 
However, one issue they did reach a consensus on was 
that Northern Ireland had its own Bill of Rights process. 
The details of this finding is outlined as follows: 
We [the Commission] recognise the distinctive Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights process and its importance to the 
peace process in Northern Ireland. We do not wish to 
interfere in that process in any way nor for any of the 
conclusions that we reach to be interpreted or used in such 
a way as to interfere in, or delay, the Northern Ireland Bill 
of Rights process.286
Despite their strong views, neither of the Unionist parties 
took the opportunity to make a formal submission to the 
UK Commission, having been invited at an early stage 
to do so. Despite the UK Commission’s findings both the 
DUP and the UUP have stated that there is no need for 
a separate Northern Ireland Bill of Rights.
I feel that Northern Ireland doesn’t need a separate Bill of 
Rights, [the] party .. feels the same, quite happy to look 
at the Northern Ireland aspect of it within the UK Bill of 
Rights.287
Certainly the DUP was interested in a wider UK context of a 
Bill of Rights. I know we’ve had this discussion before as to 
whether the Belfast Agreement committed to bring forward 
a Bill of Rights or was to scope what the possibilities were 
to bring forward a Bill and the DUP position was to look 
towards a UK wide basis.288
On the other hand, the SDLP and Sinn Féin welcomed 
the findings of the UK Commission:
We were pleased by those comments in the report ... we 
had taken position, fairly early on that the UK Commission 
had no relevance to here and that the decision within 
the Good Friday Agreement to constitute a Bill of Rights 
was particular to here and was separate to any UK 
Commission.289
We need our own local Bill of Rights. I stressed that fact 
[to the UK Commission] that we needed it because of our 
unique political circumstances.290
One party described the UK Commission as a 
‘distraction’291 and ‘now that’s gone ... we can return to 
the Bill of Rights’.292 The Green party also opined that 
now that the UK Bill of Rights Commission has published 
its report, ‘it does put a greater focus on us’.293 Sinn Féin 
questions whether the findings will have any importance: 
We didn’t place any importance or emphasis on the 
comments because of the eventuality that this would 
just wither in some Westminster committee or a shelf 
somewhere ... as a UK Bill was going nowhere politically. It 
had been slated and behind the scenes we’ve all been told 
politically it was going nowhere, that it was a sop to the Lib 
Dems and that eventually it would just wither.294
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 This is a view shared by the DUP and the Alliance Party:
[The] general view [was] that at the UK level [it] had been 
a disjointed process. That there had been very mixed 
messages as to what would be the outcome and what 
the commitment was to that process… and there had 
been a very pessimistic view about what the Bill of Rights 
Commission would achieve. So .. it wasn’t clear-cut that 
this commission was going to advise strongly on a Bill 
which was going to happen.295
I’m really not sure that the statement last year on the UK Bill 
of Rights has actually made any real issue to the Northern 
Ireland debate.296
This view is also echoed by human rights organisations 
which viewed the UK Bill of Rights process as ‘a 
complete waste of time … that it was never going to be 
conclusive’297 or as a ‘distraction’ and an ‘obstacle’.298 
However, it has also been argued that the UK Commission 
‘clearly understood and fundamentally grasped the 
gravity’ of a Bill of Rights to the Northern Ireland peace 
process299 and therefore served a purpose in ending the 
debate on merging the Northern Ireland process with 
any equivalent in the UK:
[the] UK Commission report last December removed a 
particular barrier and they [the British government] can’t 
turn round anymore and say ‘there’s a roadmap’ for 
including a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights process within 
any sort of debate about UK Bill of Rights because there’s 
a clear recommendation there [referring to the UK Bill of 
Rights Commission’s report].300
Sinn Féin, the only Northern Ireland party to make a 
submission to the UK Bill of Rights Commission, urged 
the UK-wide process not to interfere in the separate and 
on-going process in Northern Ireland.301 The party was 
surprised that parties who had favoured a UK wide Bill of 
Rights had not taken the opportunity to submit a positive 
response to the Commission. He stated:
It’s strange that they [the Unionists] ... haven’t entered a 
submission – we felt that Unionism was going to use the 
UK Commission as a way to subvert the call for a Bill here 
[Northern Ireland]. We had heard early on ... there was 
discussion around a chapter on a Bill of Rights for here that 
would be rolled into it and we didn’t and wouldn’t accept 
it. [I am] very surprised – I thought the Ulster Unionists 
would have at least submitted because they were the most 
engaged from a Unionist point of view.302
Another interesting finding in the UK Bill of Rights 
Commission’s report was that when the UK Bill of 
Rights Commission established an advisory panel from 
the various devolved regions to help them, there was 
no representation from Northern Ireland. The UK Bill 
of Rights Commission described this as ‘a matter of 
regret’303 as Scotland and Wales were represented on 
the panel. When asked why the devolved administration 
in Northern Ireland did not nominate advisory panel 
members, two reasons were given. One was that as 
the UK Bill of Rights Commission was dealing with the 
possibility of a UK Bill of Rights, which had no relevance 
to the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights:
our view all along [was that a] Bill of Rights particular to 
here [Northern Ireland] was more relevant, [and] was the 
only route that we should engage with and we should not 
get distracted by a UK Bill – because at that stage there 
were discussions on a UK Bill including a chapter, and then 
to re-focus some of the engagement into a UK Bill may 
have sent a wrong signal.304
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The other reason put forward by another party was that it 
strongly believed that if the UK Bill of Rights Commission 
was ‘serious’,305 Northern Ireland should be have been 
represented on the Commission not on an advisory 
panel:
Given that it was UK wide... there was a strong view with 
both Scotland and ourselves that there should have been 
direct representation, given any outcome would have 
potential significant impacts in both Scotland and Northern 
Ireland.  We should both be there collaboratively making 
decisions, because this was meant to impact across 
the entire UK, not there simply to advise about what the 
positions may be. […] There were a number of issues to 
work through but I think the key one for us was that we 
shouldn’t simply be on an advisory panel, we should be 
represented on the Commission, a decision-making body 
as to what the recommendations should be. […] We, along 
with Scotland at that time, were holding out to say we 
should actually be represented on the Commission. That 
issue never really got resolved.306
Conclusion
This chapter highlights two key points in relation to a 
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: that the proposal was 
viewed by both governments as an integral part of the 
constitutional settlement and that there was a stated 
obligation on behalf of the British government to bring 
forward legislation. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 
was overwhelmingly endorsed in a referendum in 
Northern Ireland. The political parties, as signatories 
to the Agreement also committed themselves to 
implementing the Agreement in the various declarations 
and agreements that followed. Although one of the 
Executive parties, the DUP, did not sign up to the Belfast/
Good Friday Agreement, it did agree to the proposals 
as specified under the St Andrews Agreement – one 
of which included a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. 
The Northern Ireland political parties participated 
in a Roundtable Forum established by the British 
government; facilitated by an International Chairperson 
which included representatives of civil society. Although 
the parties agreed that there should be a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland, there was no consensus on the content 
of such a Bill. Following extensive public participation, 
and taking into account the findings of the Bill of Rights 
Forum, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 
submitted its advice to the Secretary of State in 2008. 
The political parties’ attitudes to the Commission’s 
advice reflected the diversity of views that had 
previously existed. The Consultation document on the 
Commission’s advice, which the Northern Ireland Office 
issued in 2009, also created a diversity of responses 
particularly in its reference to merging human rights for 
Northern Ireland into a possible UK Bill of Rights. A UK 
Commission, established in 2011, was effectively asked 
to consider such a possibility and its report, published 
in 2012, concluded that the Northern Ireland process 
was a separate one. It stated unequivocally that the UK 
process should not interfere with the development of a 
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland that had been on-going 
for the previous thirteen years.307 Political parties in 
Northern Ireland and Scotland, as well as the respective 
Human Rights Commissions in each of the devolved 
regions, were sceptical of the process, expressing 
concern that there had been an absence of public 
consultation on the Coalition government’s proposals 
and that the current protections under the ECHR could 
be potentially undermined in the process. 
Despite the numerous British and Irish government 
declarations and formal agreements, alongside the 
findings of the UK Commission, supporting a Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland, there remains a political 
vacuum on this issue. The following chapter highlights 
the responses of the parties in addressing the question 
of what now for a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland whilst 
the final chapter discusses the outcomes of the Haass 
talks and makes a series of recommendations for the 
way forward.
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CHAPTER 4
WHERE NOW FOR A BILL OF 
RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND?
Introduction
The previous chapter highlighted the progress on a 
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland since 1998. It noted 
that the political parties, as signatories to the Belfast/
Good Friday Agreement, committed themselves to 
implementing the proposal on a Bill of Rights – with the 
British government stating its obligation to bring forward 
legislation.308 Although one of the Executive parties, 
the DUP, did not sign up to the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement, it assented to the St Andrews Agreement 
– which also expressed a commitment to progressing 
a process for a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. This 
chapter outlines the most recent views of the political 
parties, and the two governments, on a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland and focuses in particular on the current 
political vacuum in relation to this issue.
Where the Political Parties Stand
From the late 2000s, a diversity of views existed between 
the main Unionist and Nationalist parties on whether or 
not a Bill of Rights was needed in Northern Ireland. On 
analysing the language used by the two main Unionist 
parties, in their interviews for this project, their position 
appears to be that it is the responsibility of others to 
convince them that a Bill of Rights is needed for Northern 
Ireland. They argue that they are open to persuasion but 
that is where the obligation ends. For example, when 
asked what ‘open to persuasion’ meant the leader of the 
UUP admitted:
would we vote in favour tomorrow for a Northern Ireland Bill 
of Rights? The answer would be no, because we don’t see 
the argument and the need. But if you come to me and say 
– have you thought of this and this, and you can persuade 
us then we would come around to it.309
The DUP spokesperson stated the need for 
more clarity on what is being proposed: 
if we’re going to enter into a discussion again we 
need to be clear as to what it is we are trying 
to achieve … if it is a statement of core values and core 
rights [..] and it could have a variation within that, some 
could be about progressive realisation, some of it could be 
justiciable and some of it could be statement and policy [...] 
what is it that we want to achieve?310
The DUP spokesperson also noted ‘we are open to any 
discussions that are going on and any proposals that 
are being brought forward.’311 The leader of the UUP 
added ‘I think that there would be merit in looking at a 
Bill of Rights because it’s a commitment that’s sat in the 
Belfast Agreement and fifteen years on, clearly no one 
has really seriously engaged.’312
Difficulties Encountered in the 
Process
In his evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 
in February 2013, the then Chief Commissioner of the 
NIHRC, stated that both the First Minister (DUP) and 
deputy First Minister (Sinn Féin) in their meeting with 
the Commission had reconfirmed a commitment to 
delivering on a bill of rights for Northern Ireland. He 
summarised the meeting as follows: 
there were disagreements as to what its content might be 
[…] My understanding is that that is where we are. There is 
agreement on a bill, but there is political disagreement on 
the content of that bill.313
 
As part of this research, the parties were asked to 
outline their views on why progressing a Bill of Rights 
for Northern Ireland had been so difficult. In her 
response, the spokesperson for the DUP argued that 
there is a ‘mixed view over whether you need a written 
constitution, a written statement of a Bill of Rights [...] or 
whether the unwritten constitution and the values within 
4
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the criminal law system with the democratic institutions 
are sufficient to protect these rights.’314 According to the 
DUP spokesperson ‘people in Northern Ireland react 
to the concept of rights in a particular way ... and that 
is because “rights” by their very nature are often used 
against the state and using it this way in Northern Ireland 
was relatively polarising.’315 The PUP representative 
summed this up as: ‘rights are seen as a Catholic thing, 
it’s not a Protestant thing.’316 The leader of the Ulster 
Unionist Party added: ‘if you look at how rights play out, 
unionists probably feel that it has not been advantageous 
to their community.’317
The Alliance Party commented on this divisiveness: 
the Bill of Rights [..] has become toxic because nationalists 
have embraced it and unionists as a result are repelled by 
it….it’s not necessarily a logical extension of unionism to 
be against a Bill of Rights. So it’s hard to judge whether 
it’s [..] a position that they’ve taken because someone else 
is for it, then they’re against it, and that happens a lot in 
Northern Ireland.318
Sinn Féin also acknowledged that there was a dilemma 
for the main Unionist parties in being against the 
proposal, ‘publicly this is a popular issue, if people are 
asked about it upfront. […] You’ll never be against them 
[rights].’319 The Green Party noted, ‘some people (in the 
Unionist parties) would feel more comfortable if a Bill of 
Rights was to be within the UK, because [it will] be seen 
as another concession to Nationalists or whatever.’320 In 
contrast to the main Unionist parties however, the PUP 
spokesperson supported the proposal for a Bill of Rights 
for Northern Ireland and advocated that, ‘we need to be 
arguing for a Bill of Rights – it’s about keeping all that 
political stuff out of it.’321 The recently formed Unionist 
party, NI21, suggested that to get support from the 
Unionist community ‘it is about putting the message out 
there that human rights apply to all of us.’322 He took 
the view that there needed to be more public awareness 
amongst the Unionist community about its aims, ‘the Bill 
of Rights and human rights isn’t threatening to anyone; 
they are something for everyone.’323
The DUP spokesperson suggested that it might help to 
progress the discussions, ‘if we talk about something 
like ‘principles’, ‘guiding principles’ … ‘values’ then it 
could be quite different.’324 Sinn Féin acknowledged the 
difficulties over the language used to date ‘language 
within Unionist politics is very important – ‘objective 
need’, ‘equality’/‘inequalities’ – all those words are seen 
from a DUP point of view as Nationalist/Republican 
language.’325 Sinn Féin appeared open to the suggestion 
that there may be more support for a Bill of Rights if it was 
to be called something else, a Charter or a Covenant. 
They believed that ‘it doesn’t matter what it’s called or 
where the rights are located as long as they’re there.’326
The Current Stalemate
The SDLP, whilst acknowledging their firm support for a 
Bill of Rights, also recognised that more could be done: 
one of the problems is the stasis that exists in the Assembly, 
and in particular the Executive and [also] that people within 
that administration are overburdened with the abundance 
of non-negotiable issues.327
Sinn Féin agreed that little discussion had taken place 
at the Executive level and proposed that the discussions 
be broadened out beyond the Office of the First Minister 
and deputy First Minister; to include civil society and 
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the supporters of the DUP.328 Both parties have brought 
forward motions for debate in the Assembly and Sinn 
Féin and the SDLP have tabled parliamentary questions 
in the Dáil and at Westminster respectively.329 However, 
as the Irish government has publicly acknowledged, there 
remains a stalemate around a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland.330 In attempting to tackle this stalemate, the 
Alliance Party obtained a formal debate on a Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights at Westminster Hall in 2013. The 
Alliance Party MP reminded the Secretary of State:
it is the duty of Government as a co-guarantor of the 
agreement, and as a signatory to it, to engage proactively 
with all stakeholders, including political parties, to seek 
consensus on this and other outstanding issues.331
In responding to the Westminster debate, the Secretary 
of State noted that ‘the Government would like to see the 
issue resolved on the basis of consensus between the 
parties in Northern Ireland’ and that ‘it would be virtually 
impossible to adopt a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland 
without extensive cross-party support’.332 She added 
that in reaching this view:
we have discussed a Bill of Rights with a number of 
organisations and people […] we have found little—if 
any—common ground among them, but that has not been 
for lack of trying. We have certainly engaged extensively 
on this matter. […] The Government would like to see 
this issue resolved, […] but we cannot simply conjure 
consensus into existence.’333
When asked to respond to this, as part of the research, 
those parties in favour of a Bill of Rights expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the position of the British 
government. The leader of the Alliance Party argued that 
unless pressure is applied from Westminster and parties 
are ‘incentivised’334 then a process will not get started. 
The Alliance Party MP added: 
At the moment the government are taking what they claim 
is a neutral position. But, by taking a neutral position, they 
are effectively not progressing and therefore are on the 
side of no movement.’335
Where does the Responsibility Lie 
for Progressing the Issue?
The parties, in favour of progressing a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland, emphasised that the British government 
has an obligation to implement the Peace Agreement’s 
proposals – of which they consider the proposal on a 
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland to be one. It was also 
noted that the proposals in the Agreement had been 
endorsed by a Northern Ireland referendum and that 
vote, in favour of a Bill of Rights, still stands. The parties 
now felt that they were being left to be ‘persuaders’ with 
the British government having adopted a position that 
‘those who are in favour of a Bill of Rights … should focus 
their efforts on persuading those in Northern Ireland who 
remain sceptical and on building such a consensus.’336 
To summarise, these parties argue that it should not be 
their responsibility to persuade others of the need for a 
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland as this responsibility 
lies with the government.337
This concern was further highlighted in a 2014 
Westminster debate (on a Northern Ireland Bill), 
where the SDLP took the opportunity to criticise the 
government’s current position. Margaret Ritchie, MP 
noted her regret that the Government had not seen fit to 
introduce a Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland: 
There are rights that are peculiar to Northern Ireland, 
which has a particular political situation that needs to 
be recognised. I regret the fact that the Government did 
not see fit to introduce a Bill of Rights that could have 
run concurrently with this Bill through both Houses. I ask 
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the Minister to reflect on that … to talk to his colleagues 
in government, and to ensure that such legislation is 
introduced.338
However, the Minister of State for Northern Ireland did 
not appear to be familiar with the proposal for a Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights as demonstrated by his response: 
We have the Human Rights Act 1998 in place, and if all 
parties in Northern Ireland wish to propose some special 
legislation at the Westminster Parliament, we would of 
course consider it, but I see no need for such a thing, and 
I have never heard anybody suggest there was a need 
before.339
As Lady Sylvia Hermon, Independent MP for North 
Down, noted in the debate: 
I am very surprised, and exceedingly disappointed, that the 
Minister seems not to have read the Belfast agreement. 
If he had done so, he would understand that it contains 
an entire page and chapter dedicated to human rights. 
The agreement creates the Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission and gives it, among other things, the 
statutory obligation to bring forward and advise the British 
Government about a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland 
which contains rights particular to Northern Ireland … So I 
was disappointed that he put it on the record this afternoon 
that he does not understand that the agreement contains 
a specific obligation about a Bill of Rights in Northern 
Ireland.340
The SDLP spokesperson reflected his concern at the 
government’s position, ‘the rollback idea isn’t a figment 
of somebody’s imagination. You need people to be 
motivated and I don’t see that at this time.’341 Likewise 
for Sinn Féin, its spokesperson noted:
I think we’re in a worse position than we were when we 
started because we went through the motions. From 
the British government’s point of view, we have held the 
consultations, we have held the community forums, we 
have held the intense political discussions. We’re now at 
the position where there was only one decision to make 
and that was whether to implement it or not to implement 
it - and that is even implementing it in a slightly different 
format than what’s been proposed.342
The Alliance Party MP was also critical of the lack of 
engagement stating that Unionist politicians ‘have just 
absented themselves’ and went on to explain, ‘if some 
third party engages on the Bill of Rights and invites 
parties to come along it’s very easy for people to find 
a reason not to be there [..] unless there is somebody 
there at government level driving it then it’s hard to see 
how you can encourage that engagement.’343 The leader 
of the UUP acknowledged that ‘the main political parties 
together haven’t sat down and engaged on it.’344  Sinn 
Féin believed that what was needed was a little bit of 
‘hard-talk […] the government (need to) have a plan or a 
structure because otherwise [..] we are back in the same 
place. We’d just be updating positions.’345
The Issue of Devolution
A further development also arose since the Conservative/
Liberal Democrats coalition government took office. The 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland issued a letter in 
September 2011 to each of the political parties suggesting 
the possibility of the Assembly being empowered to take 
forward work in this area.346 However the parties did not 
express any interest in pursuing this and as far as we 
can ascertain, none of the parties responded to the NIO 
correspondence. Some parties expressed their concern 
at this proposal, to devolve the discussions, noting that 
parties consistently exercise a veto in the Northern 
Ireland Assembly on issues perceived by either side to 
be contentious and thus block progress on taking the 
issue forward. This is exemplified by the responses so 
far to the Northern Ireland Assembly debates on a Bill 
of Rights. As the Alliance Party noted ‘our system of 
government provides vetoes for the largest parties on 
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either side of the divide and it’s always easier to veto 
change than to veto no change.’347
Exercising a veto was not the only concern for some 
parties should the matter be devolved to the Northern 
Ireland Executive. Respondents also focused on the 
absence of consensus amongst the two main parties 
in government. For example, the leader of the Alliance 
Party argued ‘unless the largest party was in favour it 
could still be blocked … The decisions are those that 
are worked out by the DUP and Sinn Féin at Executive 
level … and worked out by the First Minister’s team and 
the deputy First Minister’s team in Stormont Castle.’348 
The Green Party also believed, ‘there’s the politically 
sensitive stuff … things go into OFMdFM and they don’t 
come out.’349 As the leader of the Alliance Party stated:
there are lots of things which are devolved which are in 
deadlock at the moment, including things which are critical, 
with massive financial consequences. [..] I’m really not 
sure if [devolving it] has any real chance of making a 
difference.350
Ivan Lewis MP, the Shadow Spokesperson on Northern 
Ireland for the Labour Party, noted that although 
devolution requires that the Executive take the lead: 
there has been no progress historically, in the peace process 
at very difficult stages without the active engagement of the 
two governments very much working together as one. And 
I think that that is absolutely crucial.351
Resolving Issues through an Alternative 
Process
Progress on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland has 
not been the only issue that has caused difficulty in 
terms of conflict resolution. In May 2013 the OFMdFM 
published its strategy, ‘Together: Building a United 
Community’ (T-BUC) which was the result of years of 
consultation around the OFMdFM’s ‘Cohesion, Sharing 
and Integration’ strategy on tackling sectarianism and 
racism, issues which are devolved to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly.+ Following much delay, this strategy 
set out the Northern Ireland Executive’s commitment to 
‘improving community relations’ particularly in relation to 
the removal of ‘interface’ walls and the development of 
shared neighbourhoods and educational facilities.353
However the Northern Ireland Executive failed to 
reach agreement on other areas, on issues of cultural 
expression such as parades and protests; flags, symbols 
and emblems and the legacy of the past.354 Recognising 
the difficulty in resolving these matters internally, the 
First and deputy First Minister agreed to establish an all-
party group that would be independently facilitated by 
US diplomat Dr. Richard Haass and Professor Megan 
O’Sullivan.355 The Haass-O’Sullivan talks took place 
between July and December 2013 with stakeholders 
from civil society also being invited to put forward their 
views. As the First Minister advocated in the Northern 
Ireland Assembly: 
Let us not hear, “Now it is up to the politicians”. In 2010, the 
politicians brought forward a set of proposals. If somebody 
has proposals for how that might be changed, let us hear 
them. If they have a better alternative, let us hear it. Let us 
start our all-party group by trying to get a resolution to the 
problems that have dogged our society.356
The Bill of Rights was not in the terms of reference 
for the Haass-O’Sullivan talks, however they were 
asked to consider ‘related matters’ which opened the 
space for other issues to be discussed. The Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission and a number of 
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groups involved in the Bill of Rights process met with 
the facilitators whilst others submitted papers. They 
took the view that a human rights based framework was 
needed to help resolve the problematic issues of cultural 
expression.357 But some NGOs argued that the Haass-
O’Sullivan process was not the appropriate place for 
discussions on a Bill of Rights fearing a ‘watering down’ 
of the international standards as politicians bargained 
over human rights.358 Sinn Féin referenced the issue 
of the delay on progressing the proposal in the peace 
agreement in its submission: ‘The British Government 
has still not introduced a Bill of rights. This void has 
contributed in no small measure to the malaise we are 
currently in, surrounding these issues.’359 The Alliance 
Party MP stated that although the issue of the Bill of 
Rights was important, introducing it into the mix would 
overburden the process and argued instead that raising 
the Bill of Rights in 
the context of trying to resolve one of those issues 
[parades] a rights based approach is part of the solution 
to those issues … since they go well beyond sovereignty 
to questions of identity, culture, traditions, language and 
more.360
Whilst noting the need for a dedicated discussion on 
human rights, she argued that these discussions might 
enable the Unionist community to deliver on the need 
for a wider framework in which these rights would be 
placed: ‘If they were all in the same pool of issues would 
it give people flexibility to do some trade around that 
politically, to be able to deliver on them?’361
The Haass-O’Sullivan talks concluded without 
agreement on 31 December 2013. The final report 
made a number of recommendations, one of which 
was that a Commission on Identity and Culture be set 
up to consider, amongst its other issues, a Bill of Rights 
for Northern Ireland.362 The Commission would consist 
of 15 members, seven elected representatives to be 
appointed by the five leaders of the Executive parties; 
the other eight members to be outside government.363  
Both Sinn Féin364 and the Alliance Party voiced concerns 
that placing the Bill of Rights into such a Commission 
would mean that there would be far less focus on it since 
the process was designed to find a resolution to flags 
and parades.365 The Irish government, in their response 
to the Haass talks, did not dismiss its inclusion believing 
that it could be a way to reignite the debate. However, 
it also noted that the inclusion of the issue on the 
Commission’s agenda should not preclude other routes 
to progress.366 The British government diverged from its 
more usual joint approach with the Irish government, 
the latter supporting the implementation of the Haass 
proposals,367 whilst the Secretary of State argued in the 
House of Commons that the talks, ‘provide the basis for 
continuing discussions between the parties.’368 Initially 
the First Minister also advocated that ‘… a working 
group … sit down ... to work out where there had been 
agreement and to identify areas where further work 
is required.’369 Contrary to the First Minister’s belief 
‘that all the parties are up for that’370 the UUP quickly 
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disengaged from the process,371 and by early July 2014, 
after a negative Parades Commission decision, the First 
Minister and his party, the DUP, also refused to continue 
with the party-leaders talks.372 The DUP, the UUP and 
the PUP then called for an inquiry to deal solely with the 
flags issue. 
Developing an Alternative Approach
Parties that pledged support for a Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights reiterated the importance of keeping the issue on 
the political agenda. Sinn Féin believed that: ‘anything 
that moves the process along, frankly anything that 
brings a freshness to what was a little bit of a dynamic 
from the Forum report to the advice by the Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission and brings that 
dynamic back into it, is useful.’373 He added a proviso 
that ‘we have to find something different’374 but what the 
‘something different’ might look like was not elaborated 
on. The leader of the Alliance Party also believed that 
an alternative approach was needed and proposed ‘a 
facilitation process, speaking to the parties and then 
putting forward proposals is the only real prospect we 
have.’375 Concurring with this view, the Alliance Party 
MP took the view that ‘getting parties around the table 
is a starting point […] but that process needs to be very 
focused and time-limited.’376 The Sinn Féin party leader 
also noted the need for greater focus: ‘issues such as a 
Bill of Rights ... are not going away’377 and remain to be 
resolved in the near future.
The Green party spokesperson used his experience 
as a participant in the Irish Constitutional Convention 
to reflect on the benefits of developing a process that 
could lead to greater collegiality amongst the parties, 
‘after all the formal business we’re all staying in the one 
hotel and we all, inevitably, go for dinner afterwards.’378 
Political parties in Northern Ireland have had experience 
of residential meetings that have helped to create a 
more congenial atmosphere and opened up space 
for discussion. We will return to this suggestion in the 
conclusion below. 
Conclusion
Following years of conflict, power relationships are 
often in flux so there is a need to ensure a fundamental 
coherence in a range of areas particularly where the 
demand for change and justice is great. The break with 
the past, embodied in transitions from violent conflict 
or from one-party rule based on dictates, provides an 
opportunity to address issues not only of the rule of law 
and good governance but other structural issues such 
as violations and abuses against particular communities. 
As noted in chapter 1, it is in such a context that a Bill 
of Rights is most needed. Technical solutions will not 
be sufficient to address these challenges without a 
foundational document setting out the principles and 
standards that will command the allegiance of the 
people. 
As this report shows, in the period from 1972-1998, 
there have been a number of constitutional moments in 
which proposals for such a foundational document, like 
a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, have been routinely 
discussed. The 1998 Peace Agreement was such a 
moment and it marked a critical step forward in gaining 
recognition for a Bill of Rights. What was intended was 
a constitutional point of reference that would become a 
legal framework through which the politicians would act. 
As chapter 1 noted the new Northern Ireland Legislative 
Assembly would, along with the other institutions in 
Northern Ireland, act in accordance with the ‘European 
Convention on Human Rights and any Bill of Rights’.379 
It was also envisaged in the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement that:
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the sovereign government …shall be founded on the 
principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, 
social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination 
for all citizens, and parity of esteem and of just and equal 
treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both 
communities.380
However, the difficulty remained in consolidating an 
approach around a coherent set of rights for Northern 
Ireland. A shared framework on the provision of the 
protection of fundamental rights, articulated by the 
Unionist parties in the Northern Ireland Forum for 
Political Dialogue in 1997,381 disintegrated during the 
Bill of Rights Forum as agreement could not be found 
on which rights should be protected, the means and 
extent of this protection and the jurisdiction to which 
they should apply. As demonstrated in this report, there 
have been various interpretations over what was meant 
by the Agreement’s proposals for a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland. This might also reflect the passage 
of time as well as the drift on the part of the Coalition 
government, following a statement by the Secretary of 
State suggesting that there is some ambiguity about the 
original wording.382 However any attempt to redraft the 
Agreement’s proposals runs the risk of jeopardising the 
original intent and the British government should now 
make clear its own view in relation to this matter. The 
concern expressed by some parties is a real one, that 
there should be no lowering the bar on a comprehensive 
set of human rights standards – through bartering these 
as a response to contentious issues or placing them in a 
UK legislative instrument that does not take account of 
the specific context of Northern Ireland.383
While the British and Irish governments have been 
engaged for many years on various initiatives in relation 
to a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, their efforts have 
been inconsistent in scope and application, lacking a 
policy framework to guide their interventions. Despite 
initial opposition, important proposals from the Belfast/
Good Friday Agreement on police and criminal justice 
reforms or the establishment of new institutions were 
eventually implemented in Northern Ireland. Had 
decisions such as the recommendations from the Patten 
Report on police reform, for example, not been taken 
forward by the British government through legislation 
at Westminster and been left instead to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly, a political stalemate would have 
resulted. Given that some of the parties, at that time, 
would have felt it necessary to exercise a veto this could 
have led to the non-implementation of a significant part 
of the peace agreement. 
Some key points arise from the research gathered here: 
that the proposal for a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland 
was initially viewed by the Irish government and the 
British government (under a Labour Party administration) 
as part of a constitutional settlement and that legislation 
would be brought forward at Westminster to implement 
this proposal.384 As noted above, both governments had 
anticipated the difficulties of legislating on the proposals 
for police reform as well as the proposals on human 
rights (such as the establishment of a Human Rights 
Commission or a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland) 
and stipulated that these should remain non-devolved 
matters during the process of their implementation. 
It is the case that in the last few years of the Labour 
government administration, a different response 
to progressing a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland 
became apparent with an emphasis being placed on 
the devolved Assembly. When the Coalition government 
came into office in 2010, its position became even more 
ambiguous, with the Conservative Party questioning 
whether an obligation to legislate on a Bill of Rights 
for Northern Ireland at Westminster even existed. The 
main Unionist parties, who had still been in favour of the 
proposal at the conclusion of the Bill of Rights Forum 
in 2008, also appear to have regressed. One outcome 
of this is that since the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission submitted its advice to the Secretary 
of State in December 2008, a political vacuum has 
developed. In addition, when the Coalition government 
established a UK Commission in 2011 to consider the 
possibility of a Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom, 
the government proposed that a separate chapter of 
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this Bill could deal with the rights specific to Northern 
Ireland. The UK Commission unequivocally rejected this 
proposal and stated that any UK Bill should not interfere 
with an independent process that was part of the peace 
agreement.385 A further proposal from the Coalition 
government was that the discussions on a Bill of Rights 
be devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly.386 None 
of the political parties responded to the government’s 
proposal. The stalemate needs to be urgently addressed 
and we recommend that the British and Irish governments 
develop a policy framework to create greater coherence 
in their approach to a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. 
The framework should clarify how the governments see 
their joint role in implementing the obligations under the 
Belfast/Good Friday and St. Andrews Agreements and 
help to dispel the differences that currently exist in their 
approach to a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. 
This report also noted the diversity of opinion that 
currently exists on progressing a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland. The Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist 
community’s attitudes towards a Northern Ireland Bill 
of Rights have diverged. Loyalist-aligned parties have 
continually supported the concept of a Bill of Rights whilst 
mainstream unionism has at times advocated for a Bill of 
Rights and at other times rejected the idea. Nationalist 
and Republican parties have continuously called for a 
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland and the Alliance Party 
has supported proposals for a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland since its inception in the 1970s. 
We recommend that the framework for taking forward 
this work should also produce guidance for the political 
parties on what a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland entails. 
The report shows that there is as yet no clear consensus 
on whether a Bill of Rights should be understood more 
narrowly as rebuilding trust between citizens and state, or 
whether it ought to encompass efforts to ‘heal’ society in 
some larger sense. The importance of having a ‘guided’ 
process also lies in the fact that a clearer understanding 
of human rights helps politicians as ‘the bearers of 
human rights’ to develop a common perspective on the 
protection of these rights irrespective of the political 
make-up. As noted in the introductory chapter, the rights 
contained within a Charter or Covenant are enjoyed by 
all - they are viewed as fundamental rights as opposed 
to the rights that flow from ordinary legislation.
As the report shows, Bills of Rights in countries 
transitioning from conflict are under increasing pressure 
to address not only violations of political and civil rights, 
but also economic, cultural and social rights that help 
to increase the prospects of a sustainable peace and 
societal development. As Schmid notes:
Addressing violations of economic and social rights in 
transitional justice underscores the idea that all human 
rights are interrelated and equally important. In addition, 
including economic and social rights in post-conflict justice 
has the potential to significantly enhance human security 
after the conflict. Continuing violations of economic and 
social rights may exacerbate tensions, lead to renewed 
conflict, and result in further violations of civil and political 
rights.387 
At the same time, for a Bill of Rights to be practicable, 
it needs to be realistic in terms of its reach. It also has 
to uphold and promote international laws and standards 
– such as the new generation of rights pertaining to 
persons with disabilities, women and children. The 
material gathered in this report reveals the diversity of 
knowledge amongst the parties on the applicability, and/
or justiciability of various human rights standards and 
points to the need for guidance on these issues that 
would greatly assist the parties in their deliberations. 
The NIHRC’s advice (alongside the NIO consultation 
document) has not been deliberated on through all party 
discussions nor has the British government responded to 
the findings of the UK Commission that a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland is a separate issue and should proceed 
accordingly. We recommend that the framework, to be 
agreed between the governments, would provide an 
opportunity to ascertain the extent of agreement and/
or disagreement on the proposals put forward to date. 
In establishing a process for discussions between the 
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parties, as part of this framework, the parties should 
be asked to address the question as to what they 
understand to be the role of a Charter/Bill/Covenant of 
Rights. Answers to such questions, which have been 
addressed previously, should be used as the basis for 
banking agreement and building consensus. In taking 
forward such a process, it is critical that the political 
parties benefit from the experience of independent 
human rights experts, international organisations and 
those with expertise in scoping out or drafting bills of 
rights. This technical expertise should be used to enable 
the parties to design a set of agreed principles from 
which they can agree on the rights appropriate to the 
particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, using the 
NIHRC’s advice (or any other advice) as a tool to assist 
with their decision making. 
What might work best could be a combination of elements: 
a framework that clearly identifies the objective and how it 
will be achieved; political and financial commitment from 
the two governments to assist the process; and a variety 
of useful tools designed to help political parties carry 
out their discussions effectively. In addition, a high-level 
champion could help ensure support for the framework. 
Dialogue is important to ensure that the high-level 
support is seen as helpful to the process and to gauge 
what the parties wish to achieve in terms of outcomes. 
Some consideration should be given to identifying not 
only a respected champion for the process but also to 
identify a location where dedicated discussions can take 
place away from the glare of publicity and unnecessary 
interference. 
It is clear from this report that it is not possible for local 
political actors to take the lead on this themselves, either 
because the requisite political will has been lacking, or 
because there is insufficient capacity in terms of both 
time and resources (technical and legal). The process 
has to be supported by the two governments as well as 
international actors whose experiences are critical to 
enabling political parties to reach agreement. But the 
two governments should also build in local institutional 
capacity and expertise. There is also the question of 
ownership of the process. Initially the parties should be 
given the space to work out their points of agreement, 
and differences, but a policy framework should identify all 
relevant stakeholders for the later stages and advocate 
an inclusive process that brings in civil society in order to 
ensure broad support in Northern Ireland for any future 
Bill of Rights. 
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Ms. Nicola Browne, Director (Policy)  
UNISON 
Ms. Patricia McKeown, Regional Secretary – Northern Ireland  
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